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INTRODUCTION 
At first blush, intent evidence seems to have little relevance in 
contemporary monopolization or general antitrust analysis.1  Most 
courts and commentators have dismissed it as having little or no 
probative value.2  Judge Frank Easterbrook, for example, declared in 
                                                          
 1. There are a few distinct intent issues that should not be confused.  One is 
whether specific intent is an essential element of monopolization cases.  In the 
context of criminal antitrust violations, specific intent is an indispensable element.  
See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978) (maintaining 
that “a defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal antitrust 
offense which must be established by evidence and inferences drawn therefrom and 
cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of 
wrongful intent from proof of an effect on prices”).  Specific intent requires proof 
that the action was “undertaken with knowledge of its probable consequences.”  Id. at 
444. 
In civil antitrust cases, however, specific intent is not a required element (although 
it is required for attempted monopolization).  See id. at 436 n.13 (“Our analysis 
[requiring intent] focuses solely on the elements of a criminal offense under the 
antitrust laws, and leaves unchanged the general rule that a civil violation can be 
established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.”); see 
also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(contending that “[t]o read [section 2 of the Sherman Act] as demanding any 
‘specific’ intent, makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious 
of what he is doing”); STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 99-100 (1993) 
(distinguishing attempted monopolization, which requires proof of specific intent, 
and monopolization, which does not). 
This Article does not address specific intent, and my proposal should not be 
misconstrued to require proof of specific intent in non-criminal monopolization cases.  
Rather, my focus is on the role or probative value of intent evidence in 
monopolization cases. 
For an argument that specific intent should be a required element of the 
monopolization offense and that the evidence of such specific intent must be 
objective, see generally Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 657 (2001). 
 2. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(describing most intent evidence as being of “no value” and referring to analyses of 
intent as being a “relatively fruitless inquiry” in antitrust rule of reason cases); see also, 
e.g., FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 270 n.14 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting 
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A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms,3 that “[i]ntent does not help to 
separate competition from attempted monopolization,”4 and 
derisively remarked that “[t]raipsing through the warehouses of 
business in search of misleading evidence both increases the costs of 
litigation and reduces the accuracy of decisions.”5  A leading antitrust 
treatise is similarly dismissive, stating that “bad intent is easily proven 
but seldom serves to distinguish situations where the defendant’s 
conduct deserves condemnation from those in which it should be left 
alone.”6 
Yet, careful examination of a few key modern monopolization cases 
shows that courts, in fact, do sometimes consider intent evidence.  In 
United States v. Microsoft Corp.,7 perhaps the most important 
monopolization case of the last few decades, the opinions of both the 
D.C. Circuit and the district court are replete with references to 
Microsoft’s anticompetitive intent.8  They pointed to numerous 
                                                          
summarily opinion and intent evidence). 
 3. 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 4. Id. at 1402. 
 5. See id. (also contending that “[a]lthough reference to intent in principle 
could help disambiguate bits of economic evidence in rare cases . . . the evidence 
offered to prove intent will be even more ambiguous than the economic data it seeks 
to illuminate”). 
 6. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 601, at 5 (2d 
ed. 2002); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1035, 1039 (2000) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Monopolization Offense] (arguing that 
intent is not helpful in analyzing monopolization because “the ‘intent’ to create a 
monopoly anticompetitively cannot be distinguished from the intent to do so 
competitively”); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust 
Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 258 (1995) (observing that both the Chicago and post-
Chicago schools “relegate the issue of anticompetitive intent to a minor role in 
antitrust doctrine”). 
Only a handful of commentators have expressed contrary views.  See Thomas L. 
Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed:  Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 857, 877-79 (2004) (critiquing several courts’ summary rejection of opinion and 
intent evidence without evaluation of their probative value); Lawrence A. Sullivan, 
Monopolization:  Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the Transformation of the Law, 60 
TEX. L. REV. 587, 632-33 (1982) (remarking that “[a]ntitrust law would profit were 
[intent evidence] returned to its historical role”); Spencer Weber Waller, The 
Language of Law and the Language of Business, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 283, 315 (2001) 
(noting, with disapproval, the devaluation of intent evidence in antitrust analysis). 
 7. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 8. See id. at 76 (stating that “Microsoft documents . . . indicate that Microsoft’s 
ultimate objective was to thwart Java’s threat to Microsoft’s monopoly in the market 
for operating systems”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, ¶ 72 
(D.D.C. 1999) (noting Microsoft’s fear that “[Netscape] Navigator’s enthusiastic 
reception could embolden Netscape to develop Navigator into an alternative 
platform for applications development”); id. at ¶¶ 166-169 (explaining Microsoft’s 
plan to bind Internet Explorer tightly to the Windows operating system, “maximize 
the usage of Internet Explorer at Netscape’s expense,” and “get consumers to use 
Internet Explorer instead of Navigator”); id. at ¶ 212 (addressing Microsoft’s attempt 
at “establishing control over the boot process . . . to ensure preferential positioning 
for MSN and Internet Explorer”); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. 
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internal corporate documents, senior executive statements, and other 
evidence of Microsoft’s intentions to destroy Netscape as a 
competitor and to deceive another potential competitor, in order to 
prevent a possible future threat to its Windows operating system 
monopoly.9  Similarly, in LePage’s Inc. v. 3M,10 a 2003 case in which the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found 
exclusionary conduct, the court referred often to the defendant’s 
intent to use bundled rebates and exclusive dealing contracts to 
exclude a competitor.11 
Two Supreme Court cases, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp.12 and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,13 similarly 
drew on intent evidence in their analyses of dominant firm conduct 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.14  Like Microsoft, neither of these 
two decisions can be explained fully by a pure economic analysis 
based solely on theory and empirical data.  They confirm, then, that 
intent evidence continues to play an important role in at least some 
monopolization cases, despite rhetoric to the contrary. 
This article hopes to bring the issue of intent evidence to the 
forefront and to reclaim a role for it in monopolization analysis.  
Intent evidence became devalued, beginning in the late 1970s, with 
the emergence of the Chicago school and its accompanying emphasis 
                                                          
Supp. 2d 30, 39  (D.D.C. 2000) (describing a campaign conducted by Microsoft on 
three fronts, in which Microsoft (1) linked Internet Explorer to Windows “to ensure 
the prominent (and ultimately permanent) presence of Internet Explorer on every 
Windows user’s PC system, and to increase the costs attendant to installing and using 
Navigator on any PCs running Windows;” (2) “imposed stringent limitations on the 
freedom of OEMs [original equipment manufacturers or computer manufacturers] 
to reconfigure or modify Windows 95 and Windows 98 in ways that might enable 
OEMs to generate usage for Navigator in spite of the contractual and technological 
devices that Microsoft had employed to bind Internet Explorer to Windows;” and (3) 
“used incentives and threats to induce especially important OEMs to design their 
distributional, promotional and technical efforts to favor Internet Explorer to the 
exclusion of Navigator”); id. at 43 (stating that Microsoft “employed an array of 
tactics designed to maximize the difficulty with which applications written in Java 
could be ported from Windows to other platforms and vice versa”). 
 9. See supra note 8. 
 10. 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 11. See id. at 158 (referring to plaintiff’s powerful evidence that 3M’s rebates to 
retailers “were designed to induce them” to refuse to deal with the plaintiff); see also 
id. at 163 (concluding that the jury had sufficient evidence to determine that “3M 
intended to force LePage’s from the market,” then curtail its own sales of low-priced 
tape in order to increase sales of its premium Scotch-brand tapes, and referring to 
3M executives’ boasting that large retailers “had no choice but to adhere to 3M’s 
demands”). 
 12. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 13. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (prohibiting monopolization, attempted 
monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize); see infra Part IV.B (analyzing the 
reliance on objective intent evidence in Aspen Skiing and Eastman Kodak).   
LAO.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:08:37 PM 
2004] INTENT IN MONOPOLIZATION ANALYSIS 155 
on a strict economic approach to antitrust law.15  I argue that, even 
assuming a commitment to a pure efficiency criterion in 
monopolization cases,16 intent evidence remains (or should remain) 
very relevant because it informs economic analysis and can add to its 
functionality. 
To establish monopolization, a defendant must be shown to have 
substantial market power in a defined market and to have used 
“exclusionary” (or “predatory”) conduct to gain or preserve that 
power.17  As to what constitutes exclusionary or predatory conduct, 
however, there is little consensus,18 although both the Chicago and 
post-Chicago schools appear to require a showing, not only of 
exclusion of rivals, but also of anticompetitive effects.19 
Under orthodox Chicago theory, an effects analysis requires proof 
that the conduct has limited or very likely will limit output.20  Under 
this empirical test, intent evidence would largely be irrelevant.  But, 
                                                          
 15. See infra Part I.B (detailing the theoretical framework of the Chicago school). 
 16. Not all commentators agree that a pure efficiency standard should be applied 
in antitrust cases.  See generally Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust:  A New 
Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981) (arguing for a broader standard for 
antitrust enforcement); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) 
(challenging the allocative efficiency interpretation of the Sherman Act); Lawrence 
A. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines:  What Are the Sources of Wisdom of 
Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977) (describing the variety of social values 
properly involved in antitrust analysis). 
 17. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
 18. Areeda  and  Hovenkamp  define exclusionary conduct as 
acts that (1) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging, or prolonging 
monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either 
(2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the 
particular consumer benefits that the acts produce, or (2c) produce harms 
disproportionate to the resulting benefits. 
3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at ¶ 651a; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ANTITRUST LAW 194-95 (2d ed. 2001)  (proposing that conduct be defined as 
exclusionary if the defendant has monopoly power and the practice is likely to 
exclude “an equally or more efficient competitor”). 
 19. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 
ANTITRUST L.J. 693, 694 (2000) (contending that “[r]ecent Supreme Court 
pronouncements have confirmed that no matter how bad a firm’s conduct is, or how 
injurious to rivals, there can be no Section 2 violation without injury to 
competition”); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp.,  253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 
2001)  (stating that “to be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have 
an ‘anticompetitive effect’”). Some cases, however, have seemingly presumed 
anticompetitive effect, from the absence of any legitimate business justifications.  See 
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-86 (stating that Kodak’s liability rested on whether 
Kodak could provide valid business reasons for its actions); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 
585 (arguing that “[i]f a firm has been attempting to exclude rivals on some basis 
other than efficiency,” it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory (quoting 
BORK, infra note 20, at 160)). 
 20. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
90-160 (1978) (discussing the neoclassical efficiency model’s assumption that only 
practices that artificially restrict output are economically inefficient). 
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as even staunch Chicagoans concede, output data is usually either 
unavailable or practically impossible to obtain or process, which 
makes the superficially simple Chicago tests unworkable except in the 
simplest markets.21 
Post-Chicago economic theories, while more realistic, involve 
complicated models and are surprisingly indeterminate in their 
application.22  Theories of market imperfections, “raising rivals costs” 
(RRC), game theory and so forth essentially hypothesize 
anticompetitive harm when conditions specified in the models are 
present.23  But they do not negate neutral or efficient explanations for 
the dominant firm’s behavior under those conditions.  Nor do the 
theories produce determinate results when the factual situation 
deviates even slightly from the models’ assumptions.  Thus, a post-
Chicago effects analysis based solely on economic data is often 
unsatisfactory. 
A pure effects analysis is even more deficient in new economy (or 
high technology) markets, where reduced innovation competition, 
not higher prices and less output, is the primary antitrust concern.24  
Predicting prospective harm to innovation is difficult because it 
requires showing, in markets where many innovations fail, that better 
alternatives would have been introduced but for the incumbent’s 
exclusionary conduct.  The difficulty is compounded where “network 
effects” are present, that is, where a product becomes increasingly 
valuable to users as the user base enlarges, without much regard to 
the intrinsic qualities of the product.25  In these situations, as I will 
illustrate with Microsoft, predicting effects is a mighty speculative 
exercise—one that cannot be performed with mere economic tools.26 
While a current proposal, the “sacrifice” test, might indeed take all 
guesswork out of the determination of exclusionary conduct, the test 
suffers from a fundamental flaw.  It treats sacrifice of short term 
profits as a necessary, though insufficient, condition for finding 
exclusionary conduct, when not all exclusionary conduct requires 
sacrifice of short-term profits.27  Using the recent Verizon 
                                                          
 21. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (describing limitations of Chicago 
school tests). 
 22. See infra Parts I.B.2, II (analyzing post-Chicago school theories). 
 23. See infra Part I.B.2.a (defining game theory); infra Part I.B.2.b (discussing 
raising rivals’ costs). 
 24. See infra Part II.B (analyzing the problems inherent in evaluations of 
economic effects in high technology markets). 
 25. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the theory of network effects). 
 26. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 27. See infra Part II.C. 
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Communications Inc. v. Trinko, LLP28 case as illustration, I therefore 
argue that the test, although determinate, should not be applied 
formalistically as a bright-line test. 
Where the effects, based solely on empirical data and theory, are 
neutral or inconclusive, there is, of course, the option of taking no 
antitrust action.29  Those who favor this laissez-faire approach 
generally argue that any attempt to proscribe conduct not 
demonstrably inefficient could result in judicial error, which would 
then deter dominant firm innovation.  But there is neither empirical 
nor strong theoretic proof that monopolies, relative to competitive 
conditions, are more conducive to innovation.  There is also little 
evidence that consistently resolving ambiguities in favor of dominant 
firms would not reduce net industry innovation, rather than enhance 
it, by deterring fringe firm innovation more than it would encourage 
dominant firm innovation.  Furthermore, protecting the competitive 
process is important in its own right:  as long as a rival is allowed to 
compete against a dominant firm without interference, competitive 
possibilities (however slim) remain. 
To the extent that inaction may not be the best monopolization 
policy whenever effects, based on economic data and theory, are 
ambiguous, I argue for an alternative approach—that of looking to 
intent evidence for further guidance and as a proxy for effect.  Intent 
evidence is useful since no one is likely to know better the probable 
effects of a practice than the firm engaging in it. 
The main objections to the use of intent evidence are that 
procompetitive intent and anticompetitive intent are supposedly 
impossible to distinguish, that intent evidence is too subjective and 
unreliable, that juries are prone to misconstrue employees’ poor 
choice of sports and war metaphors for corporate anticompetitive 
intent, and that the presence or absence of intent evidence depends 
mostly on defendant’s legal sophistication.30  These problems are all 
overstated.31 
Discriminating between anticompetitive and procompetitive intent, 
though difficult at times, is possible.  Factfinders in our judicial 
system are institutionally adept at determining who did what and why.  
If a corporate document (or testimony) demonstrates that the 
dominant firm wanted to cut costs through use of an ambiguous 
                                                          
 28. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 29. See infra Part III.A (criticizing the non-interventionist approach). 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
 31. See infra Part IV (refuting criticism of the use of intent evidence in 
monopolization analyses). 
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strategy, for example, the intent would not be improper even if a rival 
is eliminated as a result.  If, on the other hand, the evidence shows 
that the dominant firm wanted to prevent another firm from 
competing on the merits through its strategy, the intent would be 
improper.  While the evidence may be unclear at times, courts are 
not strangers to the task of making fine factual distinctions. 
Intent evidence can be either objective or subjective.  Where it is 
objective, as in Aspen Skiing and Eastman Kodak, and partially in 
Microsoft, three modern monopolization cases where intent was a key 
factor, intent evidence is, of course, no more and no less reliable than 
other types of evidence.32  As for subjective intent, the argument that 
subjective statements are inherently suspect because corporate 
executives making them may not mean what they say33 (but juries do 
not realize that) is perhaps the least persuasive of all objections.  
Whether a particular statement truly reflected the dominant firm’s 
intentions or was merely a lone executive’s loose talk is precisely the 
type of assessment that factfinders are competent to make.  There is 
nothing to indicate that juries are more naïve and susceptible to 
error in discerning intent in antitrust than in other cases.  As long as 
the subjective statements carry certain indicia of credibility, they can 
be helpful in interpreting the objective steps taken by a dominant 
firm, even when the objective steps themselves are ambiguous. 
Another related argument against the use of intent evidence—that 
it has little value because it favors sophisticated firms34—also has little 
merit.  While it is true that sophisticated firms are less likely to 
generate paper trails documenting bad intent, it is unclear why intent 
evidence should be ignored if it is otherwise reliable, simply because 
the system is imperfect. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I addresses exclusionary 
conduct by explaining and critiquing the traditional, the Chicago, 
and the post-Chicago school paradigms on monopolization.  I argue 
that intent evidence already plays an important, albeit 
unacknowledged, role in post-Chicago analysis, especially in the 
application of game theory and raising rivals’ costs.  Part II presents 
the argument that a pure economic effects analysis is inadequate in 
                                                          
 32. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the three cases as relying on objective intent 
evidence). 
 33. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 214-15 (“Especially misleading is the inverterate 
tendencies of sale executives to brag to their superiors about their competitive 
prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that are compelling evidence of 
predatory intent to the naïve.”). 
 34. See id. at 214 (noting that a firm employing executives sophisticated in 
antitrust matters is less likely to leave a paper trail revealing its intent). 
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most markets, particularly in network effects markets where 
innovation competition is important.  The sacrifice test, though 
determinate, is flawed to the extent that evidence of sacrifice is 
deemed necessary, though not sufficient, for a finding of exclusionary 
conduct.  Part III makes the case that an antitrust policy of non-
intervention, except where the effects are demonstrably inefficient, is 
not the answer, and that the better approach is to turn to intent 
evidence as an additional analytical tool.  Part IV addresses and 
refutes the main objections to the use of intent evidence.  This article 
concludes that monopolization analysis will be better served by 
recognizing the probative value of intent evidence, as some cases 
have done despite Chicago (and post-Chicago) disapproval. 
I. EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN MONOPOLIZATION CASES 
A. The Traditional Monopolization Paradigm 
On its face, section 2 of the Sherman Act could be applied to 
condemn a dominant firm that simply gained or retained its 
dominance in the market through inventing a better mousetrap.  The 
statute provides merely that “[e]very person who shall monopolize” 
any segment of interstate commerce is guilty of a felony,35 but does 
not define the term “monopolize.”36  The Supreme Court has 
suggested from the start, however, that section 2 would not be 
interpreted to ban a “monopoly in the concrete”37—there must be a 
                                                          
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (condemning “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with another person to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations”). 
 36. It is clear, however, from legislative debates that Congress intended to ban 
only those monopolies involving “the use of means which made it impossible for 
other persons to engage in fair competition,” not those that are derived from 
“superior skill and intelligence.”  21 CONG. REC. 3151, at 3152 (1890). 
 37. See Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); see also Am. 
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) (affirming the jury 
instruction that it is not monopolization merely because “one may own or control . . . 
all the business of a particular commodity.”); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 
148 F.2d 416, 430-32 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that acquiring monopoly power through 
superior skills or “business acumen” would not be unlawful). 
In the 1940s and 1950s, there was some support among antitrust academics for a 
no-fault standard for section 2.  See, e.g., Edward Levi, The Antitrust Laws and 
Monopoly, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 183 (1947) (suggesting “a new interpretation of the 
Sherman Act” that “can give the act strength against monopolies as such” (emphasis 
added)); Eugene Rostow, The Sherman Act:  A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 567, 577 (1947) (envisioning section 2 of the Sherman Act as a tool to 
deconcentrate American industries). 
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bad act in the dominant firm’s acquisition or protection of its 
monopoly.38 
Courts and commentators have since struggled with defining what 
conduct is considered exclusionary or predatory, the now-favored 
terms for bad conduct.39  Earlier monopolization cases apparently did 
not require proof of anticompetitive effect,40 especially not as the 
term is narrowly defined in economic efficiency terms to mean 
reduced output and higher prices.41  Judge Learned Hand, in his 
famous opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),42 
suggested that it was sufficient to show that the dominant firm had 
substantial market power in the relevant market and that, in 
acquiring or protecting that power, it foreclosed its rivals from 
competing on the merits.43  A year later, the Supreme Court endorsed 
Alcoa in American Tobacco Co. v. United States.44 
                                                          
 38. Probably the most widely quoted definition of monopolization is that it “has 
two elements:  (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and 
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.”  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
 39. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(noting that “[w]hether any particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather 
than merely a form of vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern”); Kenneth L. 
Glazer & Brian R. Henry, Coercive vs. Incentivizing Conduct:  A Way Out of the Section 2 
Impasse?, 18 ANTITRUST 45 (2003) (“It is difficult to discern any clear and consistent 
standards from [monopolization] cases.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951) 
(finding that proof of success of the monopolization attempt was unnecessary to 
sustain a section 2 violation); Am. Tobacco Co., 328 U.S. at 810 (stating that “[n]either 
proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of actual exclusion of existing or 
potential competitors is essential to sustain a charge of monopolization under the 
Sherman Act”); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through 
the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 507 (1999) (noting that “[e]arlier 
Supreme Court decisions under Sherman Act [section] 2 do not require proof of 
lowered output, raised prices or other harm to competition, and the black letter 
elements of the monopolization offense are limited to a ‘bad act’ and monopoly 
power”). 
 41. See Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for 
Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 346 (describing anticompetitive 
harm as “the allocative loss that comes about when firms raise price over long run 
marginal cost, and thus deprive consumers of goods for which they are willing to pay 
more than the costs of production”); Muris, supra note 19, at 697 (describing 
anticompetitive effects as “the ability to raise price and restrict output”). 
 42. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).  Although Alcoa was a Circuit Court decision, it 
has almost the stature of a Supreme Court case because the Supreme Court, lacking 
a quorum of six qualified judges, had certified the case to the Second Circuit to hear 
it as a special statutory court pursuant to the authority of 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1944). 
 43. See id. at 429-31 (suggesting an inclination to find a monopolization offence 
once monopoly power is shown, unless that power had been “thrust upon” it or was 
attributable solely to technological superiority or natural monopoly conditions). 
 44. 328 U.S. at 811-12.  The Court’s historic approach was influenced by the 
traditional Harvard School of industrial organization that was dominant before the 
mid 1970s, and which took a dim view of monopolists.  The Harvard theory 
postulated that operation at optimal economies of scale rarely required firms to be 
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Over time, courts classified potential exclusionary conduct into 
discrete categories, each with its own operational test, instead of 
analyzing all such conduct under a unitary standard.45  In the classic 
case of exclusion by refusal to deal, Lorain Journal v. United States,46 the 
Supreme Court again did not appear to require proof of 
anticompetitive effect.  In that case, the sole newspaper in town 
refused to accept advertisements from businesses that also wished to 
advertise on WEOL, the town’s new and only radio station.47  
Observing that Lorain Journal’s “purpose and intent”48 was “to 
destroy the broadcasting company”49 by cutting off its advertising 
revenues, the Court held that the newspaper’s “attempt to regain its 
monopoly . . . by forcing advertisers to boycott a competing radio station 
violated Section 2.”50  In its opinion, the Court did not discuss whether 
other advertising alternatives existed (which would constrain Lorain 
Journal’s power to raise prices) or whether and how overall 
advertising output was affected, thus suggesting that anticompetitive 
effect was not an essential element of exclusionary conduct, or was 
simply assumed.51 
                                                          
very large, that dominant firms are capable of imposing substantial entry barriers, 
and that firms tend to function uncompetitively even at rather low industry 
concentration levels.  See generally JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION:  THEIR 
CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 1-42 (1956); Joe S. 
Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty 
Manufacturing Industries, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 15 (1954); see also Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427 
(warning that “[m]any people believe that unchallenged economic power deadens 
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy”). 
 45. See ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE:  CASES, CONCEPTS 
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 665-66 (2002).  In addition to unilateral 
refusals to deal and predatory pricing, which are discussed infra Part I.B.2.a, other 
main types of exclusionary conduct include “exclusive dealing,” and “tying” or 
“bundling.”  See POSNER, supra note 18, at 193-244.  Exclusive dealing refers to 
agreements between a dominant firm and its supplier or customer that prevent the 
supplier or customer from doing business with the dominant firm’s rivals.  Id. at 229-
32. Tying arrangements describe situations where firms with dominance in one 
market refuse to sell that (tying) product to buyers unless those buyers also buy a 
second (tied) product from them.  Id. at 197-207.  Closely related to tying is 
bundling, which is the sale of more than one product as a package.  Id. at 234-36.  
Exclusive dealing and tying arrangements can satisfy the exclusionary conduct 
element of section 2 of the Sherman Act, and they can also be challenged under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14 
(2000).  For a current case alleging monopolization through exclusive dealing and 
bundling, see LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 46. 342 U.S. 143 (1951). 
 47. Id. at 148. 
 48. Id. at 149. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 152. 
 51. In fact, the Court even said that “it was not necessary to show that success 
rewarded” the Journal’s actions to establish a section 2 violation.  Id. at 153.  
Although Lorain Journal is probably the least controversial of the earlier 
monopolization cases, a few commentators have recently questioned whether the 
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In predatory pricing, another main category of exclusionary 
conduct, anticompetitive effect also did not seem to be required.  
Predatory pricing52 refers to the practice of dominant firms drastically 
cutting prices to expel a smaller competitor and then charging 
supracompetitive prices once the competitor is driven out.53  The 
practice was traditionally seen as anticompetitive because consumers 
would be worse off in the long-run:  temporary low prices would be 
followed by monopoly pricing once the predator’s rival is expelled or 
relegated to the sidelines.54  Courts tended, in the earlier years, to rely 
on intent to determine if the pricing strategy in question was 
competitive or predatory.55  In the 1950s and 1960s, the doctrine was 
sometimes misapplied to prohibit legitimate price cuts from efficient 
firms that did not have monopoly power.56 
In these early years, except in the sliver of antitrust law where the 
per se rule applies,57 motive and intent were the hallmarks of all 
antitrust cases.58  In fact, until the Supreme Court handed down 
                                                          
newspaper’s refusal to deal was truly anticompetitive.  See generally John E. Lopatka & 
Andrew N. Kleit, The Mystery of Lorain Journal and the Quest for Foreclosure in Antitrust, 
73 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (1995). 
 52. Predatory pricing can be challenged under both section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (2000), which 
prohibits certain forms of price discrimination.  Although the legal standards for the 
two sections are not identical, predatory pricing claims brought under the Robinson 
Patman Act are usually litigated, analyzed, and decided as though they were brought 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.  See A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 
F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Because this case was litigated as if the 
complaint had named [section] 2 of the Sherman Act . . . we start with the question 
whether the plaintiffs succeed under the Sherman Act’s standard.”). 
 53. See Terry Calvani & James M. Lynch, Predatory Pricing Under the Robinson-
Patman and Sherman Acts:  An Introduction, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 376 (1982). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
 56. See id.  The misuse of predatory pricing doctrine led to skepticism about the 
courts’ ability to distinguish predatory pricing from competitive pricing, and to the 
eventual conclusion that intent should be irrelevant in predation claims.  See Rose Acre 
Farms, 881 F.2d at 1401-03 (holding that “intent is not a basis of liability . . . in a 
predatory pricing claim under the Sherman Act”); Morgan v. Ponder, 892 F.2d 1355, 
1359 (8th Cir. 1989) (“This court has realized the futility in attempting to discern 
predatory conduct solely through evidence of a defendant’s ‘predatory intent.’”); 
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 231-32 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(holding that intent is irrelevant in predatory pricing cases). 
 57. Per se illegality means that the conduct is conclusively presumed to be illegal, 
without regard to actual effects or to possible justifications in a particular case.  The 
per se rule, today, is applied only to a very narrow range of conduct, such as 
horizontal price fixing.  See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 
1, 19-20 (1979) (limiting the application of the per se rule to practices “that would 
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output”). 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948) (finding that 
power to exclude competitors, “coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that 
power” would be sufficient to find a monopolization violation); Am. Tobacco Co. v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-14 (1946) (stating that the possession of the power 
to exclude others, combined with the “intent and purpose” to exercise that power, 
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Matsushita Electronics Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.59 in 1986, 
summary judgment was infrequently granted in antitrust litigation 
precisely because intent evidence played a key role (and intent 
typically cannot be evaluated in summary procedures).60 
The emphasis on intent evidence in pre-1980 monopolization cases 
is evident from the frequent use of the words “purpose or intent”61 
and “willful” (which suggests intent).62  The Supreme Court spoke of 
the defendant’s “intent and purpose” to improperly maintain its 
dominance in the oil industry in Standard Oil Co. v. United States63 in 
1911.  In American Tobacco in 194664 and in United States v. Griffith in 
1948, the Court said that the power to exclude competitors, “coupled 
with the purpose or intent to exercise that power,” was sufficient to 
find a monopolization violation.65  In probably the most quoted 
formulation of monopolization, the Court in United States v. Grinnell66 
used the term “willful,”67 which connotes intent.  In predatory pricing 
cases in particular, intent evidence used to play a key role.68 
                                                          
was sufficient to find monopolization); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 
75-77 (1911) (speaking of the defendant’s “purpose and intent” to maintain 
dominance in the oil industry “with the purpose of excluding others”); see also 
Hovenkamp, Monopolization Offense, supra note 6, at 1037-38 (noting, and criticizing, 
the historical role of intent in monopolization cases); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 587, 
633 (stating, with approval, that in the earlier monopolization cases, “the courts 
placed as much emphasis on intent as on conduct; the offense was willful acquisition 
and maintenance of power”). 
 59. 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 60. See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (holding that:  
“summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where 
motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged 
conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.  It is only when the witnesses are 
present and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be 
given their testimony can be appraised”).  But see Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, 
Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 
74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1104, 1119-23 (citing data to conclude that, contrary to 
conventional wisdom and the suggestion of Poller, summary judgment was frequently 
granted in antitrust cases even prior to Matsushita). 
 61. See, e.g., Griffith, 334 U.S. at 106; Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 809; Standard Oil, 
221 U.S. at 75. 
 62. See United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (stating that the 
elements of the offense of monopolization are the possession of monopoly power 
and the willful acquisition of that power). 
 63. 221 U.S. at 75. 
 64. 328 U.S. at 809. 
 65. 334 U.S. at 107. 
 66. 384 U.S. at 563. 
 67. Id. at 570-71. 
 68. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 697, 698 n.12 (1967) 
(listing predatory price discrimination cases that emphasized predatory intent); see 
also 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at ¶ 738 (discussing the use of intent 
evidence in older predatory pricing cases). 
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While intent evidence was not determinative of liability, older cases 
relied upon it to help “interpret facts and to predict consequences,”69 
and to distinguish between dominant firm conduct that was merely 
competitive (perhaps aggressively so) and conduct that was truly 
exclusionary.70  The evidence was valued because facts and effects in 
complex antitrust cases are often ambiguous, and the line between 
exclusionary conduct and aggressive competition is hard to discern.71  
Knowing why a dominant firm implemented an alleged exclusionary 
practice or what it wanted to accomplish aided in the assessment.72  
The role of intent evidence became marginalized, however, when the 
Chicago school of antitrust analysis, which stresses a strict economic 
approach, emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s.73 
B. The Chicago and Post-Chicago Schools’ Monopolization Paradigms 
1. Differences and similarities between the two schools 
The Chicago school rose to prominence presenting economic 
theories that dramatically changed antitrust policy.74 On 
                                                          
 69. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 70. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1229 (describing traditional antitrust law as 
“speak[ing] in terms of intent” and describing predation as “trying to inhibit others 
in ways independent of the predator’s own ability to perform effectively in the 
market”). 
 71. See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238 (stating intent is important “not because 
a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but 
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict 
consequences.”). 
 72. Intent has different meanings.  It can mean specific intent, which is acting 
with the purpose of causing the probable consequences of one’s actions, or general 
intent, which is the mere knowledge that such consequences will follow.  See United 
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978) (explaining that the 
traditional definition of intent in criminal law distinguishes between conciously 
desiring a result and knowing a result will occur).  It may also mean purpose or 
motive.  As used in this Article, “intent” means defendant’s state of mind, or its 
motive (the desire/need that caused the dominant firm to act as it did) and/or its 
purpose (why the firm acted as it did and what it hoped to accomplish). 
Knowing defendant’s intent may clarify otherwise ambiguous facts and effects.  For 
example, if the dominant firm entered into restrictive exclusive arrangements with 
its suppliers because it wanted to improve its efficiency and sales (a procompetitive 
effect), we can infer that effect, even if the effect itself may be unclear.  Conversely, if 
the restrictive practice was implemented simply to prevent its competitor from 
effective competition, by increasing the competitor’s costs and not by improving its 
own product (an anticompetitive effect), then that was likely the effect of the 
practice, for we assume that firms know best the economic realities of their market.  
See infra Part III.B (arguing that intent evidence is a helpful analytical tool). 
 73. See Waller, supra note 6, at 315 (“In the wake of the Chicago school 
onslaught, intent evidence in all areas of antitrust analysis has been devalued, and 
with it any interest in how business decision makers form their policies.”). 
 74. The Chicago school assumes that economic efficiency is the exclusive goal of 
antitrust law, and that neoclassical price theory is the best tool for measuring 
efficiency.  See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. 
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monopolization, Chicago scholars advocate a very permissive policy 
which tolerates almost all dominant firm conduct that excludes rivals, 
unless the conduct is shown to restrict output and cannot be justified 
as an attempt to better serve consumers.75  This minimalist approach 
is due, in part, to the Chicago school’s generally favorable view of 
monopolies and to its belief that the social cost of monopoly is 
slight.76 
The Chicago narrative of dominant firms tells the story of success 
won through hard competition, superior efficiencies and 
intelligence, and economies of scale.77  It views all firms as profit 
maximizers78 and almost all business practices, including seemingly 
dubious ones, as probably no more than novel efficient strategies79 
that courts and others simply do not understand.80  And it argues that 
                                                          
REV. 213, 226 (1985) (describing the basics tenents of orthodox Chicago school 
antitrust policy).  Since only practices that artificially restrict output are allocatively 
inefficient under price theory, it follows that, under Chicago theory, antitrust law 
should prohibit only those practices.  See BORK, supra note 20, at 90-160 (articulating 
basic Chicago precepts).  For extended expositions of the Chicago approach to 
antitrust, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. 
REV. 1696 (1986), POSNER, supra note 18, and Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of 
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Chicago 
School]. 
 75. See Eleanor M. Fox, What is Harm to Competition?  Exclusionary Practices and 
Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 378 (2002) (describing the Chicago rule 
as one of:  “non-intervention unless market conduct was provably inefficient, and 
‘inefficient’ was to be given the following narrowest possible meaning:  the conduct 
must confer market power that would be used to limit output of the product or 
service, and the conduct must not be justified as an attempt to serve the market”). 
 76. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 17 n.12 (citing, but disputing, studies showing 
that the social costs of monopoly are minimal).  Though a prominent Chicago 
school scholar and jurist, Posner disagrees with these studies.  He believes that 
monopolies not based on efficiencies do carry significant social costs, but that there 
are very few such monopolies and that exclusionary conduct is, indeed, rare.  Id. at 
16-22. 
 77. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 20, at 178, 193-96 (expressing the theory that 
dominant firms that attained their size through internal growth had presumably 
succeeded through superior efficiencies or economies of scale). 
 78. Id. at 120; Posner, Chicago School, supra note 74, at 928, 931. 
 79. According to the Chicago school, there are only two avenues toward profit 
maximization:  capturing more sales at the competitive price, or exercising 
monopoly power to limit output and raise prices above the competitive level.  The 
strategies of all businesses, being rational profit maximizers, must therefore be seen 
as steps either toward efficiency (i.e., more sales) or toward monopoly.  Because 
rational businesses know that monopoly is extremely difficult to attain or maintain, 
so the argument goes, most business conduct must be seen as strategies to enhance 
efficiency.  See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting that if the agreement among Atlas Van Lines and its 
affiliates was not aimed towards creating a monopoly, it must have been designed to 
create more efficiency, as no third explanation existed). 
 80. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Does Antitrust Have a Competitive Advantage?, 23 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8 (2000) (“People are quick to condemn what they do not 
understand.  Hasty or uninformed judgments may condemn novel practices just 
because of their novelty.”).   
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constraining dominant firms’ freedom to use so-called exclusionary 
business strategies deters efficiency, coddles inefficient competitors, 
and hurts consumers.81 
In the Chicago model, markets are robust and contestable82 and 
will therefore “undercut successful monopolists and deter putative 
ones without the help of judges.”83  Further, economies of scale are 
substantial, and competitive markets require very few firms.84  
Accordingly, there is little to fear from dominant firms, even in 
concentrated markets.  The Chicago model also assumes few, if any, 
non-government imposed barriers to entry;85 therefore, it posits that 
even a monopolized market (which rarely occurs) will correct itself 
through new entry, or expanded production by existing market 
participants, without any antitrust intervention.86 
In contrast to their abiding faith in markets, Chicago school 
adherents have little confidence in the competence of the courts.87  
They contend that judges and juries often fail to appreciate the 
novelty of many beneficial business practices and, therefore, wrongly 
condemn them as anticompetitive.88  Chicagoans also tend to view the 
costs of false positives (mistakenly barring a benign practice) as high 
                                                          
 81. See BORK, supra note 20, at 137 (arguing that the results of exclusionary 
business practices are not only acceptable, they are desirable); David J. Teece & Mary 
Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly:  Antitrust Analysis in High-Technology Industries, 43 
ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 843 (1998) (arguing for a non-intervention antitrust policy 
“absent unambiguous anticompetitive conduct” because antitrust action “might 
produce severe disincentive effects throughout the economy”).  See generally 
Easterbrook, supra note 41, at 346 (arguing that, because of the benefits of aggressive 
competition and the difficulty of predicting when competition will become 
exclusionary, courts should be wary of finding antitrust violations). 
 82. For a succinct summary of the Chicago school’s antitrust precepts, see 
Hovenkamp, supra note 74, at 226-33. 
 83. Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 
305, 307 (1987); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 74, at 227 (“Monopoly, when it 
exists, tends to be self-correcting”). 
 84. See BORK, supra note 20, at 179-91 (arguing that, even in an oligopoly, the 
dangers concomitant to monopoly are not present); John S. McGee, Efficiency and 
Economies of Size, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:  THE NEW LEARNING 55, 93 (Harvey J. 
Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974) (noting that, even in a new market with only two firms, 
competition will exist because the only way for either firm to profit is to offer the best 
terms). 
 85. See BORK, supra note 20, at 310-29 (contending that natural barriers to entry, 
as opposed to government imposed ones, do not prevent capital from flowing to 
profitable markets). 
 86. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) 
(stating that such self correction is preferable to intervention by antitrust courts, 
which may foreclose practices that are potentially beneficial in the long run). 
 87. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 41, at 349 (discussing his skepticism of 
judicial and administrative ability to “second-guess markets”). 
 88. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 80, at 8 (arguing that courts are an 
inappropriate forum to solve antitrust problems because courts must make decisions 
quickly even though it can take decades to fully understand the implications of a 
business practice). 
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and far worse than the costs of false negatives (mistakenly permitting 
an anticompetitive practice).89 
Given these assumptions and theories, Chicagoans are, 
unsurprisingly, highly skeptical of claims of exclusionary conduct.90  
The Chicago school postulates that business practices alleged to be 
exclusionary are more likely to be efficient practices that have been 
misunderstood.91  They could, for instance, be practices that prevent 
freeriding or save on transaction costs.92  Or they could simply reflect 
lawful profit maximization being taken by a monopolist.93  Mistaking 
efficiency-neutral or competitive behavior for exclusionary conduct 
would, so Chicago theorists continue, chill competition and deter 
innovation.94  Thus, Chicagoans believe that plaintiffs in 
monopolization cases must prove that a monopolist’s alleged 
exclusionary conduct is economically inefficient,95 and not merely 
                                                          
 89. See Easterbrook, supra note 86, at 2 (“If the court errs by condemning a 
beneficial practice, the benefits may be lost for good. . . .  If the court errs by 
permitting a deleterious practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time.  
Monopoly is self-destructive.  Monopoly prices eventually attract entry.”); see also 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) 
(remarking that mistaken conclusions about the anticompetitiveness of business 
conduct “are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws 
are designed to protect”); Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (citing Matsushita language with approval). 
 90. See Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future:  Trade Regulation, 51 
NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290 (1956) (“The economic teaching gives little support to the 
idea that the abuses create or extend monopoly.”).  Director and Levi are often 
credited with first articulating the basic principles of the Chicago school of antitrust 
analysis.  See also BORK, supra note 20, at 309 (expressing the orthodox Chicago view 
that exclusion of competitors—without buying them or paying them off—is virtually 
impossible unless the monopolist is more efficient); Muris, supra note 19, at 693 
(suggesting that exclusionary conduct happens only “[i]n rare circumstances”); 
POSNER, supra note 18, at 194 (stating that “documented cases of genuinely 
exclusionary practices are rare,” but acknowledging that “they do exist”). 
 91. See BORK, supra note 20, at 137 (asserting that antitrust law cannot distinguish 
exclusionary conduct from efficient conduct); Posner, Chicago School, supra note 74, 
at 926-33 (arguing that tying arrangements, resale price maintenance, and pricing 
below cost are not effective methods to monopolize). 
 92. See Posner, Chicago School, supra note 74, at 926-33 (citing Chicago studies and 
commenting on the specifics of Chicago theory and assumptions). 
 93. See Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 506, 508 (1974) (“One of the achievements of the Chicago School has been 
to show that some practices thought to be exclusionary practices . . . really should be 
considered as monopoly profit maximization other than by collusion or exclusion”). 
 94. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 41, at 346 (arguing that such results 
clearly harm consumers).  Chicago school theorists typically see monopolies, even 
when they exist, as imposing very low social costs.  See POSNER, supra note 18, at 17 
n.12 (noting, but disagreeing with, a series of studies estimating that monopoly only 
costs society one-hundredth of a percent of the Gross National Product). 
 95. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and 
Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367, 388 (2001) (stating that “the plaintiff in 
a monopolization case ordinarily must come forward with evidence of actual 
consumer harm”).  The Chicagoans define  “consumer welfare” as the allocation of 
resources toward uses that are most valued by consumers, as measured by their 
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that it excluded a competitor from competing on the merits in order 
to gain or preserve its own dominance.  Intent evidence is seen as 
having little or no value; it is “even more ambiguous than the 
economic data it seeks to illuminate.”96 
Much of the appeal of the Chicago school’s approach to antitrust is 
its clarity and simplicity.97  But, ironically, these attractive attributes 
are also its weaknesses, for real world markets are usually messier 
than the models on which the Chicago theories are based.98  
Beginning in the 1980s, a group of economists and antitrust 
academics, dissatisfied with the over-simplicity of Chicago theories, 
began developing a new body of economic studies and literature.99  
                                                          
willingness to pay.  BORK, supra note 20, at 90-91.  So defined, it is almost synonymous 
with “allocative efficiency,” which describes the market equilibrium that is reached 
when prices are set in a way that causes resources to flow to the uses that maximize 
output and wealth.  Consequently, the Chicago school often uses the terms 
“consumer welfare” and “economic efficiency” interchangeably, and consumer harm 
would then mean inefficiency, or output reduction.  See Joseph F. Brodley, The 
Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1987) (“The term consumer welfare is the most abused 
term in modern antitrust analysis. Sometimes consumer welfare is used as a synonym 
for economic efficiency. . . Sometimes the term is used to refer to a particular 
consumer interest but without defining exactly what that might be.”); see also Wesley 
J. Liebeler, What Are the Alternatives to Chicago?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 (stating that 
“consumer welfare standards . . . require us to ask in each case whether the 
challenged conduct creates or increases the ability to restrict output.  If it does not, 
there is no antitrust violation.”).  
 96. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th 
Cir. 1989); see also supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (giving examples of courts’ 
and commentators’ dismissive treatment of intent evidence in modern antitrust law). 
 97. Even those most critical of the Chicago school acknowledge the clarity of its 
vision.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics:  Reflections 
on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1980) (crediting Chicago’s success to 
its proponents’ ability to present a clear theory to judges and policymakers). 
 98. For example, the Chicago theory of market robustness is premised on various 
simple assumptions, such as few entry barriers and good information, but those 
assumptions are not usually correct in real markets.  If markets are not as robust as 
Chicagoans assume, then strategic exclusionary behavior is more plausible.  See, e.g., 
Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge Chicago School Views, 
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 647-54 (1989) (discussing more complex economic 
developments that question Chicago school economics within the efficiency 
paradigm); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:  
Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 235-62 (1986) 
(illustrating how competitors may exclude their rivals by foreclosing supply or 
inducing collusion).  For other critiques of Chicago theory, see generally Louis 
Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985), 
Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:  Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617 (1999), and Lawrence A. Sullivan, 
Post-Chicago Economics:  Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement in a Less Determinate 
Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1995). 
 99. Post-Chicago economics is based on complex models that take into account 
market imperfections and strategic behavior, unlike Chicago economics, which is 
based on perfect competition and monopoly models.  Under post-Chicago models, 
exclusionary and other anticompetitive conduct can be rational.  See generally Baker, 
supra note 98 (presenting post-Chicago theories).  For symposia scholarship on post-
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Their scholarship, now known as the post-Chicago school, called into 
question many assumptions underlying Chicagoan theories and, 
hence, undermined their validity.100 
To oversimplify, post-Chicago economic studies show that market 
imperfections, such as information gaps, sunk costs, and network 
effects (or network externalities)101 are more pervasive than the 
Chicago model assumes.102  They theorize that dominant firms can 
strategically take advantage of the imperfections in order to create or 
enhance their market power.103  In other words, real world markets 
are less robust and less contestable than Chicagoans imagine.  Hence, 
strategic conduct—conduct that is profit maximizing due to its effect 
on competitors and not to its own efficiency104—is quite plausible,105 
and business conduct considered efficient or benign under Chicago 
theory may, in fact, be exclusionary.106 
On the surface at least, despite their different perspectives on 
markets, judicial competence, and dominant firm behavior, the two 
                                                          
Chicago thought, see Symposium, Post-Chicago Economics, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 445 
(1995) and Symposium, Post-Chicago Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1989). 
 100. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 6, at 240-50 (discussing the post-Chicago challenge 
to Chicago theories). 
 101. See infra Part II.B (defining and discussing network effects). 
 102. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 98, at 651-52 (describing sunk costs and their effect 
on competition conditions); Kaplow, supra note 98, at 536-37 (“Markets do not always 
function in accordance with the textbook model of perfect competition, and the 
economic analysis of any situation must be adjusted accordingly.  In fact, the whole 
of antitrust concerns the study of imperfect markets.”); David M. Kreps & Robert 
Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 256, 276-77 
(1982) (showing that firms have imperfect information about markets, their 
competitors, and their options). 
 103. See, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover & Garth Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and 
Antitrust, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 537, 538 (Richard 
Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989) (“Theoretical models studied here 
provide a guarded support for the proposition that strategic choices made by 
dominant firms are not invariably consistent with the objective of welfare-
maximization and that some constraints on firm behavior may, in fact, increase 
welfare.”). 
 104. For a discussion of some exclusionary strategies, see MICHAEL PORTER, 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 210-12 (1985). 
 105. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 98, at 213-14 (rejecting the Chicagoan 
view that exclusion claims are “chimerical” and explaining that, under certain 
conditions, dominant firms gain or protect their monopoly by entering into 
exclusionary contracts that raise the costs of their competitors’ inputs). 
 106. Oliver E. Williamson has written quite extensively on strategic behavior that 
the Chicago school considers benign or efficient.  See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, 
Antitrust Enforcement:  Where It’s Been, Where It’s Going, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 289, 314 
(1983) (discussing a firm’s incentive to engage in predation and other strategic 
conduct issues); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments:  Using Hostages to Support 
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 536-37 (1983) (showing that some nonstandard 
contracting practices should not be assumed efficient); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Predatory Pricing:  A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 286 (1977) 
(presenting a strategic analysis of predatory pricing). 
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schools have much in common.  Both are committed to efficiency as 
the exclusive goal of antitrust law,107 and both agree that only acts 
with anticompetitive effects should be considered exclusionary.108  
And, post-Chicagoans seemingly share the Chicago view that intent 
evidence should largely be irrelevant in antitrust analysis.109  However, 
I argue below that intent actually complements post-Chicago analysis 
and makes it more accessible. 
2. Post-Chicago analysis and intent evidence 
As earlier mentioned, intent evidence has almost no place in the 
Chicago mode of antitrust analysis.110  Given Chicagoans’ insistence 
that antitrust law should be or “has become . . . a branch of 
economics,”111 and the lack of any economic methodology for 
evaluating intent, this treatment of intent is unsurprising.  According 
to Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, a staunch 
Chicagoan, “[i]ntent does not help to separate competition from 
attempted monopolization and invites juries to penalize hard 
competition.”112  And he suggests that “[s]tripping intent away brings 
the real economic questions to the fore at the same time as it 
streamlines antitrust litigation.”113 
While post-Chicagoans may not be as skeptical of exclusionary 
claims or of judicial competence, they evidently share the Chicago 
view that only economics matters in antitrust.114  Therefore, any 
suggestion that intent evidence plays, or should play, an important 
role in post-Chicago analysis of monopolization may initially seem 
incongruous.  Yet, a closer examination reveals that such a suggestion 
                                                          
 107. See Baker, supra note 98, at 646 (discussing Chicagoans’ and post-Chicagoans’ 
common ground); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 222-24 (noting that Chicagoans and post-
Chicagoans agree on many fundamental antitrust principles but disagree as to how 
the market truly works and how to best enforce antitrust laws). 
 108. See, e.g., John E. Lopatka, Exclusion Now and in the Future:  Examining Chicago 
School Orthodoxy, 17 MISS. C.L. REV. 27, 33 (1997) (asserting that most Chicagoans and 
post-Chicagoans share the view that “only those instances that have anticompetitive 
effects” are exclusionary). 
 109. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 258 (observing that “both schools relegate the 
issue of anticompetitive intent to a minor role in antitrust doctrine”); Waller, supra 
note 6, at 304-10, 334 (suggesting that even post-Chicago discourse is limited to 
economics and pleading for the inclusion of business theory in antitrust analysis).  At 
the very least, no post-Chicago scholar has taken the issue of intent evidence to the 
forefront to discuss its relevance or importance. 
 110. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text. 
 111. Easterbrook, supra note 83, at 305. 
 112. A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989); 
see also supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (collecting commentary that argues 
against the use of intent evidence in antitrust cases). 
 113. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d at 1402. 
 114. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (explaining that both schools 
focus on anticompetitive effects in their analyses). 
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may not be out of place.  Although it may be unacknowledged, intent 
evidence is actually important to effectual post-Chicago analysis, as 
the following discussion of two main post-Chicago theories—game 
theory and “raising rivals’ costs”—illustrates. 
a. Game theory and predatory pricing 
In recent years, post-Chicagoans have applied game theory and 
other theoretic models in an attempt to resuscitate the traditional 
view of predatory pricing as an effective exclusionary tool115—a view 
that the Chicago school had earlier demolished.116  Orthodox 
Chicago theory holds that predatory pricing is irrational and, 
therefore, virtually never happens.117  Under the Chicago model, 
predatory pricing is doomed to fail because the predator has to take 
staggering losses at the outset and must recoup its losses once the 
victim is eliminated.118  However, the predator will generally not 
                                                          
 115. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 361-88 (1988) 
(demonstrating, under game theory, that predatory pricing could be rational and 
that, even if prices are set above average costs, it has the potential of excluding 
equally efficient competitors); see also Janusz A. Ordover, Predatory Pricing, in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 77, 79 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998) (describing predatory pricing, in broad terms, as forgoing competitive profits 
in order to limit future competition either by forcing a rival’s exit or by excluding a 
potential rival); Patrick Bolton et al.,  Predatory Pricing:  Strategic Theory and Legal 
Policy, 88 GEO L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) (highlighting the possibility of predatory 
pricing as an instrument of abuse); Aaron Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 
111 YALE L.J. 941, 955 (2004) (arguing that above-cost pricing can be anticompetitive 
when incumbent monopolists have significant cost and non-cost advantages); Alvin 
Klevorick, The Current State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83 AM. ECON. 
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 162, 165-66 (1993) (urging the judiciary to incorporate new 
market-organization models into the law on predatory pricing and to articulate a test 
“in the context of situations where one believes predation may be rational for the 
predator”). 
 116. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (explaining why Chicagoans 
reject predatory pricing as a plausible tool for exclusion). 
 117. The Chicago school literature on predatory pricing is greatly influenced by 
the work of John McGee, who wrote in 1958 that predatory pricing was not rational 
behavior because it was cheaper to monopolize by buying, rather than underselling, 
a competitor.  See John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting:  The Standard Oil (NJ) Case, 1 
J.L. & ECON. 137, 143 (1958) (arguing that Standard Oil dominated the market by 
buying out competitors at or above market prices); see also BORK, supra note 20, at 
144-54 (arguing that predatory pricing is generally implausible); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 
(1981) (concluding that courts need not take predation seriously because every 
possible predatory strategy, though superficially plausible, is unrealistic because of 
the risks faced by the predator and the responses available to rivals).  Posner, 
however, disagrees with this orthodox view.  He views predatory pricing as “more 
likely to be genuinely exclusionary than tying,” and he recognizes that predatory 
pricing in one market to deter entry in other markets can be a profitable strategy.  
POSNER, supra note 18, at 207-10.  He also acknowledges that, under limited 
conditions, it may be an effective strategy for a monopolist to price below cost to gain 
a reputation for predation, so as to deter entry from potential rivals.  Id. at 211-13. 
 118. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-90 
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succeed at recoupment because, once it attempts to raise prices after 
the victim is forced out, the victim will return or new entrants will 
enter the market, pushing prices back to the competitive level.119 
Chicagoans argue that because predatory pricing practices are 
implausible, they are “rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”120 
Reflecting this view, Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner proposed a 
bright-line, cost-based, benchmark.121  Under this test, sales below 
average variable costs would be considered predatory, but sales above 
that cost level would not.122  Other scholars, even more skeptical of 
predatory pricing claims, insist on additional proof that the alleged 
predator has a high probability of recouping its losses.123  In 1993, the 
cost/recoupment camp scored a decisive victory when the Supreme 
Court adopted its strict test in the famous Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. case.124  Quite recently, in United States v. 
AMR Corp.,125 the Department of Justice lost the first predatory pricing 
case it had brought in many years because it was unable to satisfy 
Brooke Group and show that American Airlines had set price below cost 
in its successful effort to drive out low-cost airlines at its Dallas-Fort 
Worth hub.126 
Post-Chicago literature has raised serious questions about the 
Brooke Group premise that predatory pricing is implausible.127  In 
                                                          
(1986) (asserting that a predatory scheme can only be successful if the predator is 
able to maintain monopoly power long enough to recoup its losses and gain 
additional profits); see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
509 U.S. 209, 226-27 (1993) (reiterating that predatory pricing schemes rarely occur 
because they do not tend to be successful). 
 119. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225-26 (discussing the difficulty of recoupment); 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589-90 (explaining that recoupment is very difficult because 
of “quick entry by new competitors”). 
 120. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589. 
 121. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697 (1975). 
 122. Areeda and Turner actually thought that short-run marginal cost was the 
better measurement but, because computing marginal cost is extremely difficult, 
they proposed average variable cost as a surrogate.  Id. at 716-18. 
 123. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing 
Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 217 (1979) (introducing various approaches and 
schools of thought for understanding the rules and standards involved in predatory 
pricing cases). 
 124. 509 U.S. 209, 222-25 (1993) (requiring plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases to 
show that a competitor set prices below an “appropriate measure” of costs and had a 
“dangerous probability” of recouping its losses when predation ended). 
 125. 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).  For an excellent critique of AMR, see generally 
Edlin, supra note 115, at 983-87. 
 126. AMR, 335 F.3d at 1120-21.  In fact, no plaintiff has won a single predatory 
pricing case since Brooke Group.  See Edlin, supra note 115, at 941 (noting that the 
1993 AMR decision was a success for the Chicago school of thought but actually a sad 
day for consumers, well-functioning markets, and antitrust law). 
 127. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, New Theories of Predatory Pricing, in 
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112-37 (Giacomo Bonanno 
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particular, some commentators have applied game theory128 to 
explain why Chicago principles on price predation are not always 
correct—i.e., price predation is sometimes rational and, therefore, 
not necessarily rare.129  Game theory refers to strategic behavior in 
small groups of mutually dependent competitors.130  It explains that a 
player, seeking to maximize her utility, will decide on her move based 
on her perception of other players’ reaction to her move, and the 
other players’ reaction is in turn based on their perception of the first 
player’s probable reaction.131 
Applying it to predatory pricing, game theory suggests that 
predatory pricing is a plausible and effective strategy if a dominant 
                                                          
& Dario Brandolini eds., 1990) (examining new theories of predatory pricing that 
show the practice can be an effective exclusionary device); Bolton et al., supra note 
115, at 2241 (observing that modern economic theories and recent empirical case 
studies have revealed that predatory pricing can be a successful, rational, and fully 
accepted business strategy, though courts continue to adhere to older and more 
outdated theories).  It should be noted that Posner, unlike most Chicagoans, does 
not subscribe to the view that predatory pricing is implausible.  In the new edition of 
his classic book, ANTITRUST LAW, Posner acknowledges that recent scholarship has 
shown that predatory pricing may be more plausible in some circumstances than 
current case law recognizes.  See POSNER, supra note 18, at 207-23 (describing a few 
situations where predatory pricing can be effective). 
 128. For general literature on game theory and antitrust law, see Dennis W. 
Carlton et al., Communication Among Competitors:  Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 422, 425 (1997) (describing the use of game theory to analyze how 
communication may affect market outcomes); John Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis 
of Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 42, 44-45 (1980) (analyzing, under game theory, incentive resulting from 
antitrust defendants’ right of contribution); Joseph Kattan & William R. Vigdor, 
Game Theory and the Analysis of Collusion in Conspiracy and Merger Cases, 5 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 441, 453 (1997) (arguing that conduct that increases the “likelihood of an 
anticompetitive outcome is also fully consistent with vigorous competition”); Bruce 
H. Kobayashi, Game Theory and Antitrust:  A Post-Mortem, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 411, 
411 (1997) (suggesting that game theory will continue to have minimal impact on 
the application of antitrust law); Willard K. Tom, Game Theory in the Everyday Life of the 
Antitrust Practitioner, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 458-64 (1997) (analyzing oligopolistic 
coordination and mergers under game theory). 
 129. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 180-86 (1994) 
(analyzing the interplay between reputation, predation, and cooperation with 
respect to market entrants and incumbents and the rationality behind this type of 
economic model); Bolton et al., supra note 115, at 2248 (suggesting that predatory 
pricing is especially significant in rapidly growing high-tech industries that involve 
innovation and intellectual property); Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 127, at 112-37 
(arguing, based on new competition policy literature and economic theory, that 
predatory pricing is a logical exclusionary device); Ordover & Saloner, supra note 
103, at 538 (noting that predatory strategies are in fact used, and that limitations on 
such strategies could prove welfare-maximizing). 
 130. See, e.g., Kattan & Vigdor, supra note 128, at 444-51 (describing game theory 
as an attempt to understand an oligopolistic market structure wherein firms behave 
noncooperatively but are nonetheless tied because they influence one another’s 
conduct and the overall market outcome). 
 131. For a clear introduction to game theory, see BAIRD ET AL., supra note 129, at 
165-78, which explains the basic game theory principles in the context of indefinitely 
repeated games, tacit collusion, and folk theorems. 
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firm creates a reputation for irrationality by its price responses 
against a few select rivals, causing other rivals to refrain from 
aggressive competition for fear of becoming the next victim.132  Game 
theoretic studies show that, under some circumstances, the dominant 
firm can exclude (or deter) equally efficient rivals from the market by 
setting prices that are above average variable costs.133  Of course, for 
the theory to apply, the specified conditions must be present.  The 
predator has to take pricing strategies that are seemingly irrational to 
reasonable rivals; the potential rivals have to believe that the predator 
is acting irrationally, and they have to be deterred from entering the 
market, which then allows the predator to rather cheaply maintain its 
monopoly position through a reputation for predation.134 
The practical problems involved in an application of this theory to 
predatory pricing claims are quite obvious.135  It is hard to see how a 
game theoretic analysis can be applied in any case just by factoring in 
structural conditions, without taking into consideration evidence of 
the alleged predator’s intent.  Furthermore, while game theory may 
show, for example, an above-cost strategy to be possibly 
anticompetitive, it cannot refute alternative and efficient 
explanations for the pricing decisions.136  And it is hard to draw any 
conclusions as to which explanation is the more likely one without 
some examination of the defendant’s (and its competitors’) purpose 
and intent.  So, in reality, the post-Chicago school has to embrace 
intent evidence if it is to advance game theory beyond the realm of 
theory to practice.  At the very least, an intent inquiry would be a very 
helpful way to choose between competing alternative stories. 
                                                          
 132. See Baker, supra note 98, at 649 (“When a firm predates against a few rivals, it 
can create a reputation for irrationality.  Other rivals who have not experienced 
predatory competition will now reasonably fear that if they compete strongly against 
the crazy firm, it will turn and predate against them.  So they back off.”). 
 133. See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 115, at 361-88 (discussing the Milgrom-Roberts 
model that demonstrates that predatory pricing can be effective both above and 
below the cost line because such pricing schemes can influence a victim’s reaction by 
affecting the victim’s views on the predator’s future profitability). 
 134. See id. at 368-80 (demonstrating, through economic analysis of limit pricing 
and its relevance to predation, the process by which firms can successfully employ 
predatory pricing schemes to dominate a market). 
 135. Perhaps as a result of these practical problems, post-Chicago theories of 
predatory pricing have had little, if any, influence on the courts.  See Bolton et al., 
supra note 115, at 2271-74. 
 136. See Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws:  The 
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 589 (1991) (observing that business 
practices found competitively harmful under price theory could be equally likely, ex 
ante, to have pro-competitive effects such as efficiency advantages). 
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b. Theory of raising rivals’ costs and exclusionary conduct 
“Raising rivals’ costs” (RRC),137 probably one of the most influential 
post-Chicago theories on exclusionary conduct, raises many nuances 
that are well-served by considering intent.  The theory, pioneered by 
Professors Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop, postulates that, 
under specific conditions, firms can create or maintain dominance by 
engaging in strategies that raise their competitors’ costs.138  That can 
be accomplished through tying arrangements, exclusive dealing, 
unilateral refusals to deal, or other practices historically deemed 
exclusionary but which the Chicago school usually considers 
harmless.139  In essence, RRC rebuts the Chicago argument that 
exclusionary conduct is virtually non-existent or very rare, by 
providing plausible anticompetitive explanations for the conduct.140 
Without delving into the specifics,141 Chicagoans mainly believe that 
exclusive dealing and tying are rarely exclusionary because the 
                                                          
 137. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 74, at 274-80 (summarizing and 
discussing earlier scholarship on RRC). 
 138. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 98, at 213-14 (writing that “in carefully 
defined circumstances, certain firms can attain monopoly power by making 
arrangements with their suppliers that place their competitors at a cost 
disadvantage”). 
 139. See id. at 228, 230-49 (explaining that exclusive dealing, tying, and refusals to 
deal involve “exclusionary rights” and that dealing in exclusionary rights can raise 
rivals’ costs). 
The traditional objections to tying (firms with dominance in one market agreeing 
to sell only to buyers who buy a second product from them) are that it prevents 
competition on the merits in the second market and allows a monopolist in the first 
market to leverage its power in that market to gain dominance in a second market.  
See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 508 (1969) 
(stating that “the seller can use his power over the tying product to win customers 
that would otherwise have constituted a market available to competing producers of 
the tied product.”); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (stating that 
tying agreements are anticompetitive in that they deny competitors free access to the 
tied market solely because of defendant’s market power in the tying market, and not 
because of higher quality or lower prices in the defendant’s tied product); Times-
Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953) (stating “the essence 
of illegality in tying agreements is the wielding of monopoly leverage; a seller exploits 
his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next.”).  
Exclusive dealing was seen as potentially anticompetitive because it foreclosed a 
dominant firm’s rivals from competing for the business of the dominant firm’s 
customers (or for supplies from the firm’s suppliers).  An early case involving 
exclusive dealing claims is Standard Oil  Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 
(1949). 
 140. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 98, at 230-48 (identifying four distinct 
methods by which a predator can raise rivals’ costs and thereby achieve 
anticompetitive effects—two through direct foreclosure and two through tacit or 
express collusion). 
 141. There is a large body of Chicago literature criticizing the traditional analysis 
of different forms of alleged exclusionary conduct, and I will not detail the critique 
here.  For full treatment of these criticisms, see generally BORK, supra note 20, 
Easterbrook, supra note 86, and POSNER, supra note 18. 
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dominant firm’s competitors are free to compete for the 
arrangements.142  Furthermore, according to the Chicago school, the 
arrangements are not effective methods to monopolize and, 
therefore, are most likely efficient practices, or dominant firms would 
not have entered into them in the first place.143  A similar logic 
underlies the Chicago argument that unilateral refusals are highly 
unlikely to be exclusionary.  Firms with whom dominant firms have 
refused to deal, assuming they are efficient, should be able to find 
other sources of input and, therefore, the refusals are harmless.144  
Furthermore, there are probably efficiency reasons for the dominant 
firm’s refusal to deal, because no rational firm would refuse to deal 
with another unless it were inefficient to do so.145 
The theory of RRC posits that a strategy of raising a competitor’s 
costs can be an effective means for dominant firms to exercise 
monopoly power under certain conditions.146  For example, a 
dominant firm’s exclusive dealings with its suppliers may mean that 
its competitors will have to buy costlier and/or inferior inputs.  This, 
in turn, limits the competitors’ ability to compete effectively and thus 
allows dominant firms to exercise monopoly power over price.147  
                                                          
 142. For Chicago literature challenging the traditional theories underlying the 
tying doctrine, see BORK, supra note 20, at 372-74, 380-81 (discrediting the traditional 
theory of tying arrangements); Kaplow, supra note 98, at 517-20; Ward S. Bowman, 
Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 19 (1957); POSNER, 
supra note 18, at 197-207 (contending that tying arrangements are rarely 
exclusionary). 
 143. The usual justifications offered for tying arrangements are increased 
efficiency in marketing and in distributing the tied product; quality control; price-
discrimination; and inducing innovation by increasing the dominant firm’s return.  
See Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak:  Understanding the Role of 
Market Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 263, 284-92 (1994) (offering procompetitive 
explanations for tying arrangements and noting that the increased efficiency that 
may result from bundled marketing of complementary products is undisputed). 
 144. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, Monopolization Offense, supra note 6, at 1044 (arguing 
that prohibiting unilateral refusals to deal by dominant firms create perverse 
incentives—the dominant firm’s rivals “have no incentive to find or develop 
alternative sources” of supply). 
 145. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 98, at 219 (summarizing Chicago 
criticism of exclusionary claims). 
 146. Id. at 223-24, 242-49 (explaining when raising rivals’ costs may allow a firm to 
gain power over price and when it may not). 
 147. Id. at 234.  Literature on this thesis is extensive.  For a partial listing, see 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Market for 
Exclusionary Rights, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1293 n.2 (1987). 
Other post-Chicago theories have also been used to rebut the Chicago argument 
that exclusive dealing and tying are rarely exclusionary.  See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & 
Ching-to Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1161, 1163 (1993) (applying game theory to argue that, contrary to Chicago 
thinking, long-term exclusive dealings can lead to “reduced output, diminished 
return to innovation and new entry, and enhanced profit for the monopolist” in 
certain circumstances); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 837, 837 (1990) (arguing that market imperfections can make tying a 
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Similarly, tying can be an effective RRC strategy where scale 
economies are large in the tied market.148  To illustrate, if the 
dominant firm in the tying market can, through tying, foreclose a 
large percentage of a tied market which has large economies of scale, 
the per unit cost of production for its competitors in the tied market 
may rise substantially (because they will be operating below optimal 
scale).149  This would then give the dominant firm room to raise 
prices in the tied market.150 
RRC essentially adds an important dimension to the identification 
of exclusionary conduct by presenting a hypothesis of anticompetitive 
harm.  It shows that, under the conditions in the model, the 
dominant firm’s exclusionary action might be anticompetitive.  But 
RRC does not disprove possible efficiency explanations for the 
conduct, which often exist in exclusive dealings, tying arrangements, 
and other vertical relationships.  Knowing the dominant firm’s 
purpose would help the fact-finder determine the applicability of 
RRC in a given case.  Thus, RRC benefits from the consideration of 
intent. 
For example, if the dominant firm appears to have engaged in a 
strategy in order to raise its rivals’ costs (and not to improve its own 
product or efficiency), then the RRC model is probably applicable.  
However, if corporate statements or documents show that the strategy 
was intended to help the dominant firm compete more effectively in 
the marketplace, the anticompetitive outcome hypothesized by RRC 
may not be correct (even if the strategy did raise its rival’s costs), 
because the dominant firm’s purpose suggests that the practice may 
have substantial pro-competitive effects.  Thus, intent is probative in 
the application of RRC. 
To conclude, without suggesting that post-Chicago models are any 
less economic or rigorous than their Chicago counterpart, post-
                                                          
profitable anticompetitive strategy). 
 148. See Whinston, supra note 147, at 838 (showing that where scale economies in 
a tied market are large relative to total market output, an entrant to that market must 
attain sufficient scale to survive, and that tying by the dominant firm can make that 
impossible).  In every market, there is an optimal economy of scale, which is the level 
of output at which the average cost of production is lowest.  To operate efficiently, a 
firm obviously has to produce at or close to that optimal level.   
 149. Id. at 838-40; see also Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 98, at 215-19, 234-48 
(explaining how ties can raise costs). 
 150. For other post-Chicago theories on tying, see generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & 
MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE STRATEGIC USE OF TYING TO PRESERVE AND CREATE MONOPOLY 
POWER IN EVOLVING INDUSTRIES (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6831, 1998), which shows, through its model, that anticompetitive tying could occur 
where network effects are present and where the complementary (tied) good might 
become a substitute to the primary good in the future), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6831. 
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Chicago analysis would benefit greatly from the consideration of 
intent.  Given the complexities and many nuances of post-Chicago 
theories, intent evidence would complement expert testimony 
offered on these theories, making their practical application more 
feasible. 
II. THE INADEQUACY OF PURE ECONOMIC EFFECTS ANALYSIS 
Defining exclusionary conduct based solely on empirical data and 
economic theory would be workable (assuming one is committed to a 
pure efficiency criterion to begin with) only if these tools can reliably 
demonstrate which alleged exclusionary practices are inefficient and 
which are not.  The reality is that they usually cannot.151  Even an 
unadulterated output test preferred by the Chicago school is 
determinate and valuable only if we have good data on overall output 
and can quantify the output decline caused by the alleged 
exclusionary conduct, taking care to segregate and exclude any 
changes caused by external factors.  As even committed Chicagoans 
acknowledge, such data is generally unavailable or is too costly to 
obtain and process, which limits the usefulness of these “simple” 
tests.152  Furthermore, most Chicagoans concede that their elegant 
models have serious limitations in application to complicated new 
economy (or high technology) markets.153 
As the following discussion shows, post-Chicago models, while 
more realistic, are very complicated and relatively indeterminate.  
Their indeterminacy is further enhanced in new economy markets—
where reduced innovation is the feared anticompetitive effect—
because harm to innovation is typically hard to predict, especially in 
markets where substantial “network effects”154 are present. 
Finally, even the much discussed “sacrifice test,” which could 
provide a determinate outcome, is unsatisfactory because 
exclusionary conduct does not necessarily entail sacrifice of profits.155  
                                                          
 151. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 258 (discussing the indeterminacy of both the 
Chicago and post-Chicago theories of antitrust analysis). 
 152. See Lopatka, supra note 108, at 33 (“Simple tests—for instance, whether 
output declined because of a challenged restriction—are unlikely to be useful for 
lack of data.  At least, the costs of obtaining, processing, and interpreting the data 
necessary for conclusive determination of a practice’s effects are apt to be high.”). 
 153. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 250 (noting the problem of network effects and 
related issues of path dependence in new economy markets, which make those 
markets resistant to substitutes even if the substitutes are superior). 
 154. See infra Part II.B (detailing the difficulties in using economic tools to predict 
effects on innovative markets characterized by network effects and demonstrating 
these difficulties through the Microsoft case). 
 155. See infra Part II.C. 
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And, if “sacrifice” is not treated as a necessary condition for 
monopolization conduct, as I believe it should not, then the test 
would not really be determinate. 
A. The Indeterminacy of Post-Chicago Effects Analysis Even in    
Traditional Markets 
Ironically, post-Chicago scholarship, which seeks to improve the 
functionality of economic analysis, actually highlights the fact that 
economic theory and reasoning provide merely an illusion of 
certainty.  Post-Chicago models essentially lay out sets of rather easily 
identifiable conditions, the presence of which would imply potential 
anticompetitive effects.156  In effect, the models present reasonable 
hypotheses of anticompetitive harm, under specific sets of 
assumptions.  But post-Chicago economic analysis is far from 
determinate, and empirical work is insufficiently developed to answer 
critical questions bearing on antitrust liability.157 
Some of that ambiguity has already been raised in the earlier 
discussion of game theory and RRC.158  In game theory, in particular, 
minor variations in assumptions about small group dynamics and the 
settings in which the dominant firm acts can change the results.159  
But even application of everyday post-Chicago concepts, such as 
market imperfections in traditional markets, can yield ambiguous 
effects, as the 1992 Eastman Kodak160 case illustrates. 
Generally considered the primary (and first) post-Chicago triumph 
before the Supreme Court, the case involves a claim that Kodak, a 
non-dominant copier manufacturer which also controlled the market 
for replacement parts for its machines, excluded its competitors in 
the repair service market by cutting off their access to replacement 
parts.161  In affirming that summary judgment should not have been 
granted for Kodak, the Supreme Court rejected Kodak’s economic 
argument that, without dominance in the primary (equipment) 
market, it could not possibly exercise power to raise prices in the 
aftermarkets (parts and service).162  Kodak’s theory was that buyers 
will factor into their equipment buying decision high aftermarket 
                                                          
 156. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 157. See Timothy J. Brennan, Do Easy Cases Make Bad Law?  Antitrust Innovations or 
Missed Opportunities in United States v. Microsoft, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1042, 1090-93 
(2001). 
 158. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 159. See Brennan, supra note 157, at 1054-56. 
 160. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 161. See id. at 455. 
 162. See id. at 477-78 (concluding that Kodak failed to show that respondents’ 
inference of market power was unreasonable as a matter of law). 
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prices and, therefore, a competitive primary market will constrain 
Kodak’s ability to wield power in the aftermarkets, regardless of its 
market shares in those markets.163 
Relying on post-Chicago thinking on market imperfections such as 
information gaps, customer “lock-in,” and switching costs,164 Kodak’s 
competitors in the service market (the independent service 
organizations or ISOs) argued that Kodak’s exclusion of them from 
the service market, through tying and/or unilateral refusals to deal, 
could be anticompetitive despite Kodak’s lack of monopoly power in 
the equipment market.165  In agreeing with the ISOs,166 the Supreme 
Court is widely assumed to have adopted post-Chicago perspectives.167 
If this interpretation of Eastman Kodak is correct,168 the case 
highlights the indeterminacy of post-Chicago analysis.  Essentially, 
post-Chicago theory hypothesized that, where lock-in, high switching 
costs, and customers’ lack of information about life-cycle costs are 
present, tying and refusals to deal by a firm without dominance in the 
primary market may, nonetheless, be anticompetitive.  But these 
conditions are not uncommon in normal economic life:  consumers 
often suffer from some information gaps, as Justice Scalia pointed out 
in dissent,169 and some lock-in and switching costs are inevitably 
present whenever one purchases a single-brand primary product.170  It 
would be a reach to contend that every act by a brand manufacturer 
of durable goods to control its distinctive parts necessarily results in 
                                                          
 163. See id. at 465-66 (arguing that competition exists in the equipment market 
and that Kodak therefore cannot exercise market power in the parts market). 
 164. See id. at 472-73 (summarizing Kodak’s restrictive sales policy and its effects). 
 165. See id. at 464-65 (providing actual evidence of Kodak’s market power in the 
parts market). 
 166. Id. at 473-77 (accepting the ISOs’ argument that information gaps and 
switching costs could allow Kodak to raise prices in the aftermarkets even though it 
had no market power in the primary market).  For a critique of the decision, see Carl 
Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare:  Making Sense of Kodak, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 
483, 485 (1995), who argues that long-term consumer injury from monopolized 
aftermarkets will likely be rare, particularly if equipment markets remain 
competitive. 
 167. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473 n.19, 476 n.22 (citing with approval three 
articles written by Professor Steven Salop, a leading post-Chicago scholar). 
 168. See Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, 
Inc.—Information Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 759, 760 (1994) 
(disagreeing with the interpretation that post-Chicago economics explained the 
Supreme Court decision and asserting, instead, that the case reflected the Court’s 
concern with “the right of well-performing firms, valued by customers, not to be cut 
out of markets by a firm with power”). 
 169. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that gaps in 
the availability and quality of consumer information pervade real-world markets). 
 170. See id. at 496-97 (agreeing with the majority’s point that consumers will 
tolerate some level of service price increases before changing equipment brands, but 
contending that this tolerance is commonplace in smoothly functioning, competitive 
markets and is of no concern to antitrust laws). 
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efficiency loss.  The effects are simply not always knowable.  In the 
end, the Court seemed to have assumed anticompetitive effect from 
the absence of “valid business reasons.”171 
Examining “valid business reasons” means, in essence, looking to 
Kodak’s intent and purpose for the practice.  Kodak had asserted that 
it ceased supplying parts to the ISOs to protect its own good will, 
which could be hurt by the ISOs’ poor repair service.172  Another 
reason Kodak offered was that it had to control its inventory costs.173  
Post-Chicago theories of market imperfections cannot possibly help 
with an evaluation of these proffered justifications.  Ultimately, the 
question of whether a jury could consider the reasons pretextual 
depends on the relative plausibility of both sides’ competing stories, 
which, the Court correctly held, cannot be decided in a summary 
procedure.174  Therefore, if Eastman Kodak is correctly viewed as a 
post-Chicago victory, it illustrates both the indeterminacy of the post-
Chicago approach and the Court’s reliance on intent evidence. 
B. The Difficulty of Predicting and Evaluating Economic Effects on 
Innovation Competition, Particularly in “Network Effects” Markets 
1. Theory of network effects and why economic tools cannot predict effects on
 innovation 
The inadequacy of a pure economic effects analysis becomes more 
apparent in cases involving exclusionary conduct in new economy 
markets, that is, high-technology markets where innovation is 
particularly important.  Because firms in these markets usually 
compete through innovation, the anticompetitive effect of exclusion 
is not so much restricted output or higher prices (as in more 
traditional markets), but less innovation competition. 
Predictions of future harm are difficult enough in any market, but 
having to forecast harm to innovation presents an even greater 
challenge.  It would require showing “first, a counterfactual inference 
that innovators would have invented new products but for the 
predatory conduct and, second, that those products would have been 
                                                          
 171. See id. at 483 (stating that “liability turns, then, on whether ‘valid business 
reasons’ can explain Kodak’s actions”); see also Baker, supra note 40, at 502 (asserting 
that, in Eastman Kodak, “the Court did not consider effect on competition in 
determining whether the monopolization offense could be found.  Harm to 
competition was effectively inferred . . . from the absence of a valid and sufficient 
business justification”). 
 172. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. at 477-79 (holding that there were triable issues of fact concerning 
Kodak’s proffered justifications). 
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better or cheaper.”175  It is obviously hard to know with any degree of 
certainty whether the existing products/services (put out by the 
dominant incumbent) are the best possible ones, or whether superior 
alternatives are technologically feasible but not introduced because 
of the incumbent’s market dominance and exclusionary conduct.  If 
plaintiffs were required to prove anticompetitive effect in these 
markets relying only on economic tools, virtually no monopolization 
case would ever be made out against a defendant. 
The difficulty of predicting innovation harm is compounded where 
“network effects” are present.176  The economic theory of network 
effects describes situations where, the more people use a good or 
service, the more valuable that good or service is to the consumer.177  
Probably the best modern example of a product that benefits from 
substantial network effects is Microsoft’s operating system,178 
Windows.  The more consumers use Windows, the more software 
applications are written for it, which attracts even more users, and so 
on.179  This positive feedback is based not so much on the intrinsic 
quality of the product (beyond a certain point), but on the value to 
the consumer of having more users in the network.180 
The theory suggests that network effects tend to “tip” the market to 
generate a winner-take-all.181  Consumers then become locked to this 
                                                          
 175. Lopatka & Page, supra note 95, at 371; see also Andrew Chin, Analyzing Mergers 
in Innovation Markets, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 124 (1998) (setting out the current 
approach to innovation market analysis and suggesting that predictions about the 
harm to innovation may hinge on a firm’s research and development budget, if it can 
be identified).   
 176. See generally Stephen F. Ross, Network Economic Effects and the Limits of GTE 
Sylvania’s Efficiency Analysis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 945 (2001) (discussing the limits of 
efficiency analysis in markets with network effects). 
 177. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) (providing, as an example, a 
telephone and explaining that the utility of a phone depends on the number of 
other houses and businesses that have become part of the telephone network).  See 
generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic 
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488-500 (1998) (viewing the concept of network effects as 
falling on a continuum that can be divided into what the authors describe as actual 
networks, virtual networks, and simple positive feedback phenomena). 
 178. An operating system is computer software that “performs many functions, 
including . . . controlling peripherals such as printers and keyboards.”  United States 
v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  Operating systems also 
“function as platforms for software applications” by exposing “application 
programming interfaces,” or APIs.  Id. 
 179. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, at ¶ 39 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(stating that Windows enjoys positive network effects because its large installed base 
encourages independent software vendors (ISVs) to write applications for Windows, 
making it more attractive to consumers). 
 180. See Ross, supra note 176, at 950-51. 
 181. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES:  A STRATEGIC GUIDE 
TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 175-76 (1999) (explaining that when multiple firms 
compete in a market where there is strong positive feedback—meaning “the strong 
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product or standard, and later superior substitutes face substantial 
difficulty overcoming the network effects and displacing the first 
inferior product/standard.182  In other words, where there are 
substantial network effects, markets are far from robust and 
incumbents are hard to dislodge, even without any exclusionary 
conduct.183  It is also relatively easy, given the natural benefits of 
network effects, for incumbents to use tying and other predatory 
techniques to preserve their dominance.184 
The anticompetitive potential of network effects does not mean, 
however, that they are necessarily harmful to competition.  Having 
one standard or system emerge as the winner often has efficiency 
advantages.185  Therefore, where network effects are present, it may be 
unclear whether a dominant firm’s business strategy, which has 
succeeded in excluding other firms, has anticompetitive effects, or 
efficiency effects, or perhaps both.186 
Furthermore, in markets with network effects, the dominant firm’s 
conduct may result in the ousting of the fringe or potential rival 
before its nascent product is fully developed.187  In that case, the 
                                                          
get stronger and the weak get weaker”—the market tends to “tip” in favor of one 
player). 
 182. It does not mean, of course, that inferior entrenched products can never be 
displaced.  See generally Muris, supra note 19, at 720-21 (citing several examples in 
which a superior product quickly replaced an inferior one, despite the latter’s large 
market share).  If an innovation is sufficiently superior, particularly with respect to 
features that consumers value, then even sizable network effects can be overcome.  
Id.  Probably the best examples are CDs’ displacement of record albums, and DVDs’ 
displacement of videotapes.  See id. at 721 (citing, as additional examples, the car’s 
displacement of the buggy and the ballpoint pen’s displacement of the fountain 
pen).  However, where the product benefiting from network effects has little intrinsic 
value to consumers other than as part of a network, e.g. computer operating systems, 
the network effects advantage can be immense.  There are probably products 
between these two extremes where a vastly superior substitute may prevail over an 
inferior incumbent but a moderately superior product may not. 
 183. Some commentators are profoundly skeptical of the network effects theory.  
See, e.g., Muris, supra note 19, at 718-22 (opining that real-world institutions prevent 
strong network effects from dominating). 
 184. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 177, at 506.  Network effects also facilitate 
high barriers to entry, barring even potentially efficient firms from entering the 
market.  See Salop & Romaine, supra note 98, at 620 (suggesting that markets with 
large network effects may lead to monopolies and citing Microsoft as an example). 
 185. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility and 
Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70-71 (1985) (discussing both the benefits of 
standardization and the anticompetitive harm of being “trapped” into an obsolete 
standard by network effects).  See generally William E. Cohen, Competition and 
Foreclosure in the Context of Installed Base and Compatibility Effects, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 535 
(1996) (analyzing how the economic effects of “installed base” and compatibility 
shape competition in the marketplace). 
 186. See Ross, supra note 176, at 946 (stating that, where network effects exist, 
“economic tools” cannot determine whether consumer benefits from a challenged 
practice outweigh its anticompetitive harms). 
 187. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Microsoft’s exclusionary practices against 
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harmful effect is merely anticipated, and proof of prospective harm is 
very speculative when the chances of success for competing products 
in these markets are slim, even without dominant firm exclusionary 
conduct.188  In these tough situations, giving substantial weight to the 
players’ purpose and intent makes good sense because businesses are 
assumed to know the market in which they operate.  Microsoft 
provides an excellent illustration. 
2. United States v. Microsoft Corp.189 
Microsoft had, and still has, a monopoly in the intel-compatible PC 
operating systems (OS) market through its product, Windows.190  The 
OS market exhibits substantial network effects:  as the number of 
Windows users increases, more application programs are written for 
it, which attracts more users, leading to even more applications and 
other products developed for it, and so on.191 
The network effects phenomenon means that Microsoft’s Windows 
monopoly is unlikely to be dislodged by another OS product or a 
functional substitute, even a superior one.192  To attract users, any new 
OS system must support at least all the popular software applications, 
but few software developers are willing to write applications for a 
system that does not have a large “installed base,” i.e., users.193  
                                                          
Netscape and Java, which posed a potential threat to its Windows monopoly).   
 188. See infra notes 218-33 (noting that, while Microsoft clearly perceived Netscape 
and Java to be a threat to its Windows monopoly, it is unclear whether the two 
technologies actually would have succeeded in eroding the applications barrier to 
entry). 
 189. 353 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  A lot has been written about Microsoft, focusing 
primarily on economic issues, such as whether bringing the case benefited or hurt 
competition in the computer industry, and whether antitrust litigation is the 
appropriate way to handle market power in new economy markets.  See generally 
DAVID S. EVANS ET AL., DID MICROSOFT HARM CONSUMERS?  TWO OPPOSING VIEWS 
(2000) (analyzing the antitrust case against Microsoft and the arguments of both the 
Department of Justice and the software giant from an economic perspective); 
STANLEY LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT:  
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999) (examining the case 
against Microsoft and concluding that, in high-tech markets, consumers benefit from 
serial monopolies); Ronald Cass & Keith Hylton, Preserving Competition:  Economic 
Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) (discussing, 
and disagreeing, with the economic arguments made in the case against Microsoft). 
 190. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 51-58 (upholding the district court’s finding of 
Microsoft’s monopoly power in the Intel-compatible PC operating systems market). 
 191. Id. at 55; United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, ¶¶ 30, 36-39 
(D.D.C. 1999). 
 192. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 40-43 (stating that a competing PC 
operating system would need a “large and varied enough base of compatible 
applications to reassure consumers that their interests in variety, choice, and 
currency would be met to more-or-less the same extent as if they chose Windows”). 
 193. See id. at ¶ 41 (noting also that the cost of supporting software applications is 
very large, and thus adds to the challenges a new OS system faces in having enough 
applications written for its system to compete with Windows). 
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Without software applications for the system, a large installed base is 
unlikely to develop.194  Network effects, in essence, create an 
applications barrier to entry to the OS market, leaving the Windows 
monopoly unchallenged.195  This monopoly could be more easily 
toppled, however, if consumers could use their desired software 
applications and share their files with other users, regardless of which 
operating system is on their computers, that is, if the applications 
barrier can be overcome.196 
The government’s main claim against Microsoft was that Microsoft 
perceived a threat to its Windows monopoly, not from any competing 
OS product, but from potential “middleware platforms.”197  
Middleware platforms are software that could, if and when they are 
fully developed, “expose” sufficient “application programming 
interfaces,” or APIs, to allow applications to be written for the 
middleware, without reliance on a particular OS’s APIs.198  If and 
when development reaches that stage, and if enough consumers use 
the middleware platform, software developers would likely write 
applications for the middleware.199  Consumers who have the 
middleware platform would then be free to choose their OS without 
regard to the availability of software applications written for the OS.200  
The successful development of a middleware platform that is popular 
with consumers, therefore, has the potential to eliminate or minimize 
Windows’ network effects advantage.201 
Microsoft apparently believed that Netscape’s Navigator, then the 
dominant browser, was close to becoming a middleware platform.202  
                                                          
 194. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60; Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 40-43 (pointing out 
the circular nature of this process, in that consumers want an OS with a large 
number of applications, but software developers are hesitant to write applications for 
a system that does not have a large “installed base”). 
 195. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 55 (maintaining that this circular process ensures 
that applications will continue to be written primarily for Windows and that 
consumers will continue to prefer Windows over competitor systems); Microsoft, 84 F. 
Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 30, 36-39. 
 196. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60 (suggesting that, without the applications barrier, 
a consumer could select an OS based solely upon its quality and price, and the 
market for operating systems would be competitive); Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 
29, 68 (noting that a middleware platform has the potential to weaken the 
applications barrier). 
 197. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 68-77 (discussing various middleware 
platforms such as Netscape Navigator and Java). 
 198. For a detailed description of middleware platforms, see Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 
53 and Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 28-29, 68-77. 
 199. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶ 77 (noting that the middleware technologies 
were far from being in a position to overcome the applications barrier to entry). 
 200. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 68. 
 201. Id. at ¶¶ 68-77. 
 202. See id. at ¶¶ 68-72 (explaining Navigator’s three key qualities that give it the 
potential to weaken the applications barrier:  first, as a browser, it can achieve 
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It feared that if Navigator remained the dominant browser in a fast 
growing market of internet users and also successfully developed its 
middleware platform capabilities (i.e., exposed sufficient APIs to 
support full-featured applications), software developers would begin 
to write applications for the browser.203  Computer users who have the 
Navigator browser would then have access to their favorite software 
applications, no matter which OS system might be on their 
computers.204  This would result in the loosening of Microsoft’s grip 
on its windows OS monopoly. 
In an effort to protect that monopoly, Microsoft developed its own 
browser, the Internet Explorer (IE), and bundled it with Windows.205  
Then, through various devices, including restrictive exclusive 
contracts with computer manufacturers (also know as original 
equipment manufacturers or OEMs), internet service providers, and 
others, Microsoft foreclosed Netscape from the main avenues of 
distribution for its browser.206 
Microsoft perceived another middleware threat—from Sun 
Microsystems, which had developed a new “Java” language.207  Upon 
successful development, Java’s cross-platform technologies could also 
serve as a middleware platform.208  Assuming that enough users have 
Java on their computers (which was then very likely since Netscape 
had agreed to include a copy of it with Navigator),209 applications 
developers would write for Java, which would then minimize the 
applications barrier to entry and erode Microsoft’s Windows OS 
monopoly.210  To prevent that potential outcome, Microsoft licensed 
Java from Sun Microsystems under an agreement to ostensibly 
promote Java, then modified it to make it run only on Windows,211 and 
either induced Java developers to work on Microsoft’s version of Java, 
                                                          
widespread use; second, Navigator can serve as a platform for other software; and 
third, Navigator has been ported to over fifteen different operating systems). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. at ¶¶ 133-35. 
 206. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60-62, 70-72 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (pointing out that license restrictions imposed by Microsoft on OEMs 
effectively deterred them from pre-installing browsers other than Internet Explorer); 
Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 136-237, 242-306, 311-56 (discussing Microsoft’s 
exclusionary strategies). 
 207. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 68, 73-77 (describing the Java technology). 
 208. See id. at ¶ 74 (noting that Java would enable applications written in its 
language to run on multiple platforms with minimal porting). 
 209. Id. at ¶ 76. 
 210. Id. at ¶¶ 74, 77. 
 211. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 74 (setting out the four steps that Microsoft took to 
prevent Java from developing into a cross-platform threat); Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d 
at ¶¶ 386-90. 
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or deceived them into believing that the Windows version was Sun-
compliant and that their development was for a cross-platform.212 
Although the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, 
famously rebuked District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson for 
his extrajudicial comments on Microsoft,213 remanded the tying claim 
for a rule of reason analysis,214 and vacated the divestiture remedy,215 it 
actually upheld most of the government’s claims, including claims 
that Microsoft’s exclusive dealing arrangements with OEMs and 
internet service providers, and its inducement and deception of Java 
developers, were exclusionary and violated section 2.216  However, a 
closer examination of the facts of the case shows that this result 
cannot be adequately explained by a pure economic effects analysis.217 
While Microsoft’s behavior clearly left Netscape with inefficient 
access to consumers and prevented fair competition on the merits 
between the two browsers, the effect of its behavior, in the strict 
economic sense, is not as obvious.  What is certain is simply that 
Microsoft’s IE has replaced the Navigator as the dominant browser, 
and that Microsoft Windows continues to enjoy a monopoly in the OS 
market.218  However, the theory that Microsoft’s conduct has 
anticompetitive effect in the strict economic sense requires proof of 
more than that:  it has to be demonstrated that, left alone, Netscape 
would most likely have successfully developed Navigator’s middleware 
platform capabilities, that software writers would write applications 
for it, and that a competing OS program (or new hybrid products) 
would emerge and enter the market, thereby diminishing Microsoft’s 
                                                          
 212. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76-77 (citing internal Microsoft documents, such as 
e-mails, that confirmed that Microsoft intended to deceive Java developers); Microsoft, 
84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 395-406. 
 213. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 107-11 (setting forth the code of conduct for judges 
and concluding that Judge Jackson violated the judicial code of conduct by his 
extrajudicial comments to reporters). 
 214. See id. at 89-95 (rejecting the district court finding that Microsoft’s bundling 
of IE with Windows was per se illegal). 
 215. Id. at 46-47.  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the divesture 
remedy largely on procedural grounds.  Id. at 97-107. 
 216. Id. at 51-78.  The court of appeals did, however, reverse Judge Jackson’s 
holding that Microsoft attempted to monopolize the browser market on grounds of 
insufficient evidence showing that browsers constituted a relevant market or that 
entry into that “market” was difficult.  Id. at 80-84.  It also reversed the holding that 
Microsoft’s modification of Sun’s Java program to make it Windows-compatible only 
was an antitrust violation, but affirmed that inducing Java developers to use 
Microsoft’s proprietary version of Java, rather than Sun’s cross-platform version, was 
anticompetitive.  Id. at 77-78. 
 217. See Brennan, supra note 157, at 1047-50 (asserting that the economic theory 
of the case was inconsistent with the evidence). 
 218. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 54 (stating that Windows accounts for a greater than 
ninety-five percent share of the market). 
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Windows OS monopoly.  Unsurprisingly, no such evidence was 
introduced in the case. 
Similarly, it was far from clear that Java would have successfully 
developed into a viable threat to Windows, absent Microsoft’s 
actions.219  To pose such a threat, Java would have to expose sufficient 
APIs to allow full-featured applications, such as word processing, to 
be written for it without reliance on the APIs of Windows.220  At the 
time Microsoft sabotaged Sun’s Java efforts, Java (together with 
Navigator) exposed less than 1,000 APIs, in contrast to the 10,000 
that are exposed in Windows.221 
The case, therefore, cannot be fully explained under a pure 
economics test.  Due to network effects, the chances of success for a 
competing product are slim, even without dominant firm 
exclusionary conduct.222  Thus, proving that the exclusionary conduct 
likely prevented new innovation in the market is very speculative.  
And, no economic tool can really help in that exercise.  It is 
instructive that both the D.C. Circuit and the district court referred 
countless times to Microsoft’s intent to eliminate Navigator and to 
cripple Java for the purpose of eliminating potential threats to its 
Windows monopoly, effectively using intent to support a finding of 
effect.223 
In short, in difficult cases like Microsoft, where an effects analysis 
would require speculating about the impact of conduct on future 
innovation, the court has shown a willingness to consider evidence of 
intent.  Given that a pure economic analysis is unworkable in these 
types of cases, the consideration of intent can hardly be said to 
undermine the “certainty” of economic analysis. 
C. The Sacrifice Test 
The “sacrifice” test, a much discussed proposal for defining 
exclusionary conduct, is indeed determinate when it is formally 
                                                          
 219. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(concluding that “the evidence does not prove that [Java and Navigator] would have 
succeeded absent Microsoft’s actions”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 
2d 9, ¶ 77 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that the “middleware technologies have a long way 
to go before they might imperil the applications barrier to entry”). 
 220. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶ 77 (comparing the combined APIs of 
Navigator and Java with Windows and determining that Windows exposed more than 
ten times the number of APIs as Navigator and Java). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text (using Microsoft to illustrate 
the impact of network effects on competition). 
 223. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was careful to state that it was 
considering evidence of intent “only to the extent it helps us understand the likely 
effect of the monopolist’s conduct.”  Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. 
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applied as a bright-line test, but the appropriateness of such an 
approach is highly questionable.224  First developed by Janusz 
Ordover, Robert Willig, and William Baumol,225 the test was intended 
to extend the Brooke Group predatory pricing paradigm to all 
exclusionary conduct.  In determining whether conduct is predatory, 
it asks whether the dominant firm’s practice would be “considered 
profit maximizing except for the expectation that . . . actual rivals will 
be driven from the market, or the entry of potential rivals blocked or 
delayed, so that the predator will gain or retain a market share 
sufficient to command monopoly profits . . . .”226  Stated differently, 
the question is whether the dominant firm’s challenged conduct 
entails short term sacrifice of profits. 
Under the test, the presence of sacrifice is considered necessary, 
but not sufficient, evidence of exclusionary conduct.227  The theory is 
that behavior not involving sacrifice of short-term profits might be 
rational business practices228 and, therefore, should be permitted.  
Conversely, a rational firm is generally expected to reject practices 
that are unprofitable in the short-run, unless it expects an increase in 
market power as a result of such practice, which would then allow it 
                                                          
 224. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
253, 255 (2003) (contending that the sacrifice test makes little sense because not all 
practices that involve sacrifice of profits are anticompetitive, and not all 
anticompetitive conduct requires sacrifice). 
 225. See generally Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of 
Predation:  Pricing and Production Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981). 
 226. Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986); accord 
Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (stating that a defendant monopolizes if it makes a “short-term sacrifice” 
in order to further “exclusive, anticompetitive objectives”); see also William J. Baumol, 
Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L. & ECON. 49, 65 (1996) 
(suggesting that average avoidable cost rather than marginal cost is a better measure 
for determining predatory conduct); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Nonprice Anticompetitive 
Behavior by Dominant Firms Toward the Producers of Complementary Products, in ANTITRUST 
AND REGULATION 115-30 (F. Fisher ed., 1985) (contending that incentives exist to 
engage in anticompetitive behavior and applying the test to such nonprice 
anticompetitive conduct); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Predator Systems Rivalry:  A Reply, 
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150-52 (1983) (arguing that the test applies to situations 
where a company introduces a new product system that proves to be incompatible 
with competitors’ products); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Access and 
Bundling in High-Technology Markets, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT 
MONOPOLY:  ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 103-28 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & 
Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999) [hereinafter, Ordover & Willig, Access and Bundling] 
(offering a three-pronged test for evaluating the competitive effects of certain 
business practices and for determining whether such practices constitute 
exclusionary conduct); Ordover & Willig, supra note 225, at 9-10 (explaining how a 
company exhibits predatory tendencies if its otherwise unprofitable business 
practices are profitable only due to the resulting exit of competitors). 
 227. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 225, at 9-10. 
 228. See id. 
LAO.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:08:37 PM 
190 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:151 
to recoup its losses.229  Thus, evidence of sacrifice creates a 
presumption of exclusionary conduct. 
While many (including the federal enforcement agencies under 
the current administration) have recently embraced the sacrifice 
test,230 others have questioned its appropriateness as a standard for 
determining non-price exclusionary conduct.231  Indeed, Professors 
Ordover and Willig, two economists widely credited for first 
developing and advocating the sacrifice test, now argue against 
treating sacrifice as a necessary element of exclusionary conduct.232   
The primary objection to viewing sacrifice as a necessary condition is 
that dominant firms can engage in exclusionary conduct even 
without sacrifice of any short term profits.233  The recent Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP234 case is a 
good example of why the absence of sacrifice should not be 
dispositive.235  Trinko involved a local telephone company’s (Verizon) 
alleged failure to give its competitor, AT&T, satisfactory access to its 
local telephone network, as required under the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996.236  The crux of plaintiffs’ Sherman Act section 2 
complaint, brought by AT&T’s customers, was that Verizon provided 
                                                          
 229. See id. 
 230. Supporters include the federal antitrust agencies under the current 
administration.  Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-20, Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682) [hereinafter, 
Brief for the United States] (urging the Court to find the challenged conduct 
exclusionary “only if it would not make economic sense”). 
 231. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 224, at 268-72 (criticizing the sacrifice test 
because anticompetitive conduct may not require sacrifice, and conduct involving 
sacrifice may not necessarily be anticompetitive); Andrew I. Gavil, Dominant Firm 
Distribution:  Striking A Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 55-58 (2004) (critiquing the 
sacrifice test). 
 232. In an amicus brief filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in Trinko, Ordover and 
Willig argued that the Court should not apply the sacrifice test.  See Brief of Amici 
Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Respondent at 7-10, Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) 
(No. 02-682) [hereinafter Brief of Economics Professors] (asserting that sacrifice of 
profits should not be treated as a necessary requirement in the context of the case). 
 233. See Elhauge, supra note 224, at 255 (arguing that “undesirable conduct that 
excludes rivals normally requires no sacrifice of short-run profits”); Gavil, supra note 
231.  Professor Gavil has also criticized the test for shifting the burden of production 
from the defendant to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff is required, under the test, to prove 
the presence of sacrifice as part of its prima facie case when, instead, the burden of 
production should be on the defendant to show absence of sacrifice as an affirmative 
defense.  Id. 
 234. 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 235. The dismissal of the case may well be a good policy because of the FCC’s 
pervasive and effective regulatory oversight over the challenged conduct, which 
probably made antitrust intervention a bit redundant.  See id. at 413. 
 236. Id. 
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poor interconnection service to AT&T in order to diminish AT&T’s 
competitiveness in the local telephone market.237 
In an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court in support of 
Verizon, federal antitrust enforcement agencies essentially argued 
that unless Verizon is alleged to have given up short term profits in 
anticipation of subsequently receiving long run monopoly profits, its 
conduct could not be considered exclusionary, and the complaint 
should have been dismissed for failure to state a claim.238  The Court 
ultimately held in favor of defendant and affirmed dismissal of 
plaintiff’s section 2 case.  The opinion spoke approvingly of the 
sacrifice test and came very close to stating that sacrifice is a 
prerequisite for finding exclusionary conduct.239 
The inappropriateness of treating sacrifice as a necessary element 
of exclusionary conduct seems obvious in Trinko.  No matter how 
much Verizon’s actions may disadvantage its competitors and their 
customers, they would never entail sacrifice of short-term profits 
because Verizon stands to profit more if it can serve more customers 
directly at retail than it can by charging AT&T what is essentially a 
wholesale price for interconnection.240  Yet, it is clear that the 
conduct, assuming the truth of the allegations, hindered 
competition.  After all, Congress mandated access specifically to 
facilitate competition in the local telephone market, since no 
competitor can compete effectively with the local network owner 
without such access.241 
If the absence of sacrifice is dispositive—i.e., no liability unless 
short-run sacrifice of profits is shown—then the test is indeed 
determinate.  But if sacrifice is not treated as a necessary condition for 
exclusion, as it should not, given the flaws of such an approach, then 
the test is really not determinative on the issue of exclusion. 
                                                          
 237. Id. at 403. 
 238. See Brief for the United States, supra note 230, at 28 (“The complaint makes 
no allegations whatsoever relating to price, profitability, or the costs of complying 
with 1996 Act access requirements.  It thus nowhere suggests that petitioner’s failure 
to comply . . . would make no economic sense apart from the tendency to impair 
competition.”). 
 239. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410 (stating that, unlike Aspen Skiing, a precedent on 
which plaintiff relied, this case did not involve a course of conduct which “suggested 
a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end”). 
 240. See id. at 410-11 (highlighting why the sacrifice of short-term profits was not at 
issue in this case, thereby justifying its dismissal). 
 241. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (2003) 
(requiring local telephone companies to provide facilities access to new entrants to 
the local telephone market); see also Trinko, 540 U.S. at 401 (describing the purpose 
of the Telecommunications Act); Brief of Economic Professors, supra note 232, at 10-
11, 21-22 (asserting that Congress passed the Telecommunications Act to ensure 
competition through access to facilities and to enhance public welfare). 
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III. MAKING A CASE FOR THE USE OF INTENT EVIDENCE 
A. Non-Intervention, Whenever Effects Are Neutral or Inconclusive, Is Not 
the Answer 
When a monopolist excludes a competitor through means other 
than competition on the merits, and the economic effect is either 
neutral or inconclusive, there are two basic policy choices:  do 
nothing, or turn to non-economic evidence to aid in the analysis.  
Under the first approach, only those dominant firm practices that are 
demonstrably anticompetitive would be prohibited while all other 
behavior would be left alone.242  If this non-intervention bias is 
adopted, monopolization in new economy markets would be virtually 
impossible to establish, as discussed in the preceding section.243  
Under the second approach, we would resort to non-economic tools 
to determine effect.  Given the limitations of empirical data and 
economic theory, the second alternative seems to be the wiser course 
of action lest we under-identify truly exclusionary conduct and, 
hence, under-deter it.244 
Those who favor a libertarian approach mainly argue that the 
alternative might result in mistaken judicial proscription of neutral or 
efficient practices, which might deter dominant firm innovation.245  
This argument implicitly assumes that exclusionary conduct is rare 
and, therefore, the probability of false positives is high.  Post-
                                                          
 242. See Easterbrook, supra note 74, at 1712 (“Until data permit a sound judgment 
that a certain type of practice is harmful, the courts should say that the plaintiffs have 
not carried their burden.”). 
 243. See supra Part II.B (discussing the indeterminacy of economic effects analysis 
in high technology markets). 
 244. Furthermore, as even Chicagoans seem to concede, adopting a policy of non-
intervention, except where the alleged exclusionary conduct is demonstrably 
anticompetitive, is inconsistent with antitrust tradition.  See John Lopatka & William 
Page, Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network Externalities:  Some Uses and Abuses of 
Economic Theory in Antitrust Decisionmaking, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 317, 317 (1995) 
(noting that, because “antitrust represents an uneasy compromise between laissez 
faire and interventionist visions of public policy,” an appropriate degree of 
government intervention is necessary).  The legislative history of the Sherman Act 
demonstrates that Congress intended to pursue various objectives, not just efficiency, 
when it passed the Act.  See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1979) (arguing that ignoring non-economic concerns 
would be “unresponsive to the will of Congress and out of touch with the rough 
political consensus” on antitrust enforcement). 
 245. See, e.g., Teece & Coleman, supra note 81, at 843-44 (arguing against antitrust 
intervention “absent unambiguous anticompetitive conduct” because such 
intervention “might produce severe disincentive effects throughout the entire 
economy”); Ordover & Willig, Access and Bundling, supra note 226, at 103-04 
(contending that antitrust should be applied “only to the most certain and 
compelling threats to competition” because of the “repressing effects of long 
investigations”). 
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Chicagoan scholarship, however, has raised serious questions about 
these assumptions.246 
A dominant firm bias might also be justifiable from an economic 
perspective if monopolies (relative to competitive markets) are 
conducive to innovation and also impose few social costs.  In that 
case, erring on the side of allowing exclusionary conduct would inflict 
minimal loss on society.  In contrast, disallowing harmless 
monopolistic practices that happen to exclude rivals might deter 
innovation on the part of monopolists. 
There is, however, neither empirical nor clear theoretical support 
for the hypothesis that monopolistic conditions, relative to 
competition, encourage more innovation.  It is true that Joseph 
Schumpeter once famously made that hypothesis, reasoning that 
monopolies are better able to appropriate the value of their 
innovations and, hence, have greater incentives to innovate.247  Others 
have similarly contended that the desire for monopoly profits drives 
innovation.248  If this is true, then a hyper-cautious monopolization 
policy might be warranted from a dynamic efficiency perspective, so 
as not to discourage innovation. 
Recent economic scholarship has, however, called into question 
Schumpeter’s thesis.  In particular, the work of noted economist 
Kenneth Arrow suggests that competition, not monopoly, provides the 
greater impetus for innovation.249  This view holds that monopolists, 
                                                          
 246. See supra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2.a-b (discussing post-Chicago models, including 
game theory, and RRC). 
 247. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106 (3d ed. 
1950).  For discussion of Schumpeterian theory, see generally WILLIAM L. BALDWIN & 
JOHN T. SCOTT, MARKET STRUCTURE AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 1-4 (1987), 
summarizing Schumpeter’s contribution to the study of the process of innovation, 
and Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns 
in Merger Analysis:  The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 574-76 (1995), 
discussing Schumpeter’s theory that a monopoly is better positioned to innovate. 
 248. See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 504 U.S. 
398, 407 (2004) (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short 
period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking 
that produces innovation and economic growth.”); Teece & Coleman, supra note 81, 
at 809-24 (arguing that the enticement of monopoly profits drives innovation and 
that antitrust enforcement against high technology companies should be avoided 
because it would be a disincentive to innovation); John E. Lopatka, United States v. 
IBM:  A Monument to Arrogance, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 156 (2000) (observing that 
“periods of ‘monopoly’ profits drive innovation, and it is the innovative process, 
more so than lower prices, that best serves consumers”). 
 249. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 157 (Julius Margolis ed., 1971) 
(arguing that more incentive to invent exists under competitive conditions than for a 
monopoly); see also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 660 (3d ed. 1990) (concluding that very high market 
concentrations are “apt to retard progress by restricting the number of independent 
sources of initiative and by dampening firms’ incentive to gain market position 
LAO.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:08:37 PM 
194 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:151 
already extracting maximum profits from their dominance in the 
market, have less to gain from innovation.250  Firms without 
dominance, in contrast, have higher expected profits from 
innovation and, therefore, more incentive to innovate.251  
Furthermore, firms in competitive markets may feel compelled to 
innovate simply to stay competitive.252  If competition, more than the 
quest for monopoly profits, is the engine that drives innovation,253 
then a permissive monopolization policy might actually result in a net 
loss in innovation.  Monopolists, facing minimal risk of antitrust 
sanction, may step up their exclusionary activities, which would 
discourage innovation from smaller firms. 
In short, economic theory does not clearly show that market 
concentration increases innovation, or that consistently resolving 
ambiguities in favor of dominant firms would enhance (rather than 
reduce) net industry innovation.254  Also, very little or no empirical 
data exists to support the argument that prohibiting exclusionary 
conduct with inconclusive efficiency effects would over-deter 
innovation.  In fact, a commentator has persuasively argued the 
reverse:  that in winner-take-all markets (as when network effects are 
important), a policy preventing dominant firm exclusion of fringe 
firms should increase net innovation, by encouraging fringe firm 
innovation while not deterring too much dominant firm innovation 
                                                          
through accelerated R&D”); F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency and Progress, in 
REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 148 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991) 
(noting that monopolies often generate inefficiencies because monopolistic 
enterprises do not tend to be a source of innovation and progress). 
 250. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 18-19 (suggesting that a monopoly may have less 
incentive to innovate because it “has already appropriated the portion of consumer 
surplus”). 
 251. See id.  
 252. See id. at 20. 
 253. See Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the 
Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 215-18 (1999) (citing studies 
suggesting that much of the impetus for innovation comes from competition). 
 254. See Baker, supra note 40, at 512 (“As a matter of economic theory, it is 
impossible to say for certain whether enforcement of the antitrust prohibition 
against monopolization, which might restrict the conduct of a dominant firm, will on 
balance enhance or reduce aggregate industry innovation in general.”); Susan 
DeSanti & William Cohen, Competition to Innovate:  Strategies for Proper Antitrust 
Assessments, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  INNOVATION 
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 320 (Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (asserting that 
there is “no unambiguous economic theory or empirical showing to support a 
general proposition that increased market concentration leads to reduced 
innovation activity,” but acknowledging that “a specific merger between R&D 
competitors might remove powerful incentives for R&D rivalry”); POSNER, supra note 
18, at 20 (concluding that there is no “clear theoretic prediction concerning the 
relation between market structure and innovation,” and that empirical data provides 
no answer either to the question whether “monopoly retards or advances 
innovation”). 
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efforts.255  Dominant firms are unlikely to be discouraged by some 
antitrust constraints in these markets because of the size of the 
potential winner-take-all prize.256 
Finally, a non-intervention policy is unwise because competition 
itself and the competitive process are worth protecting, even where 
static efficiency models do not clearly show anticompetitive harm.257  
The existence of even a fringe rival provides at least some hope of 
potential real competition in the market.  Therefore, where efficiency 
effects are inconclusive but the dominant firm has engaged in 
strategies that prevented its rivals from innovating or competing 
effectively on the merits, it is counter-intuitive, even from an 
economic perspective, to give the dominant firm the benefit of the 
doubt.  Allowing a rival, no matter how insignificant, to survive and 
compete against the monopolist at least helps preserve competitive 
possibilities in the market. 
Some critics may contend that this argument violates the maxim 
that antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors.258  But it is 
questionable whether this “protect competition, not competitors” 
mantra is truly apt in new economy markets, i.e., industries where 
technology is frequently changing and technological improvements 
can revolutionize the nature of the good or service.  Without 
competitors, it is hard to know whether a dominant firm’s product is 
the best that technology can produce, or whether improved (or 
better, but different) products are feasible but have not been 
introduced because of the incumbent’s dominance and exclusion of 
rivals.  Thus, protecting competition may be inseparable from 
protecting competitors in these markets. 
To use Microsoft again as illustration, it is difficult to assess 
whether Windows provides the best functionality for interfacing with 
computer hardware and software, or whether other technologically 
superior alternatives are capable of being developed, if no competitor 
is given a fair opportunity to develop its technologies once it is 
                                                          
 255. See Baker, supra note 40, at 511-15 (analyzing innovation incentives for 
monopolies and fringe firms). 
 256. See id. at 514-15. 
 257. See Fox, supra note 16, at 1169 (seeing “competition as process” as a 
justification for antitrust law); see also Ross, supra note 176, at 947 (proposing that, 
where dominant firm conduct excludes competitors by means that frustrate 
consumers’ ability to choose and network effects render efficiency consequences 
ambiguous, “courts should employ a ‘Jacksonian’ value of equal economic 
opportunity to proscribe the conduct and give others a meaningful chance to 
compete with the dominant firm”). 
 258. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993); Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
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identified by Microsoft as a threat.  Without a competitor, we cannot 
know what is possible; protecting competition, then, necessarily 
involves protecting the competitor whose innovation is still in its 
nascent stage. 
Therefore, because there is little doubt that Microsoft intentionally 
interfered with the competition process, it makes good sense to 
protect Netscape from Microsoft’s behavior because that behavior 
prevented events from unfolding that might (or might not) lead to 
more innovation, but we would not know unless firms in Netscape’s 
position are protected.  To wait for definitive evidence of 
anticompetitive harm to become available before taking any action 
will mean that antitrust intervention will rarely occur in time to make 
any difference.259 
B. Intent Evidence as a Helpful, Additional, Analytical Tool 
Until the late 1970s, as Justice Stevens said in dissent in Business 
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,260 it was assumed that “in 
antitrust, as in many areas of the law, motivation matters and 
factfinders are able to distinguish bad from good intent.”261  
Historically, courts considered a dominant firm’s purpose and intent 
valuable evidence because it tends to illuminate the effect of its act.262 
The devaluation of intent evidence began with the rise to 
prominence of the Chicago school.263  Under its influence, antitrust 
law became more of an economic science that insists on quantifiable 
data, supported by economic theory, for proof of 
anticompetitiveness.264  Perhaps because there is no empirical method 
                                                          
 259. Also, from a non-economic perspective, it seems fair to resolve any 
ambiguities about effect against the dominant firm that interfered with the 
competitive process.  It is consistent with the concept of corporate responsibility to 
impose greater responsibilities on those with greater power.  To the extent that the 
dominant firm’s strategy was designed to exclude (and did exclude) its rival, and 
predicting what might have happened otherwise is very difficult, it is reasonable to 
infer the bad effect from the defendant’s intent and shift the burden to the 
dominant firm to show efficiency justification.  It is important to remember, in the 
midst of scholarly debate over various economic models, that antitrust law is not just 
an exercise in abstract economic theory and equations; it is also a system for litigants 
to resolve disputes and to obtain justice. 
 260. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 261. Id. at 754 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 262. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) 
(stating that a defendant’s purpose for a restraint “tends to show [its] effect”). 
 263. See Waller, supra note 6, at 315 (lamenting the devaluation of intent evidence 
under Chicago influence). 
 264. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 41, at 346 (defining the goal of antitrust in 
starkly economic terms:  to prevent “the allocative loss that comes about when firms 
raise price over long run marginal cost, and thus deprive consumers of goods for 
which they are willing to pay more than the cost of production”). 
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for evaluating intent, and economists have little or no experience in 
this area, intent evidence is now routinely dismissed as having little 
value.265  This is unfortunate because intent evidence can provide 
helpful clues as to effects, for who would know better the likely effects 
of its conduct than the firm responsible for it. 
For instance, if Microsoft bundled its IE browser with its Windows 
OS for the purpose of crushing Netscape so that its browser could not 
pose a future threat to Windows, we can reasonably assume the 
bundling had an anticompetitive effect, even if that conclusion is far 
from clear based on economic data alone.  That is because Microsoft 
(or any dominant firm, for that matter) should be presumed to know 
the market in which it operates.  If Microsoft believed that 
Navigator’s middleware platform capabilities were close to being fully 
developed, that enough applications would thereafter be written for 
it, and that attractive alternatives to Windows would emerge to erode 
that monopoly unless Microsoft took action to eliminate Netscape, we 
would assume that Microsoft’s expectations are correct, even though 
proof of those eventual effects is otherwise uncertain.  It would be 
different, of course, if Microsoft’s intent in bundling was to give 
consumers added convenience or an improved product. 
The value of intent evidence is also apparent in the application of 
post-Chicago theories.266  On the surface, post-Chicago analysis seems 
to be no more than a theoretic economic alternative to the Chicago 
school, but it differs in that its application sometimes requires some 
reference to intent.267  As earlier discussed, to apply game theory to a 
                                                          
 265. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (demonstrating the rejection of 
intent evidence by many courts and commentators). 
 266. In fact, a current proposal from Professor Jonathan Baker for easing the 
identification of exclusionary conduct implicitly gives considerable weight to intent 
evidence.  Professor Baker, an economist and former director of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Competition under the Clinton administration, argues for a 
presumption of anticompetitive harm when dominant firms disrupt a cooperative or 
complementary relationship with a rival, unless the dominant firm has a legitimate 
business justification.  See Baker, supra note 40, at 496 (“[A] firm with monopoly 
power violates Sherman Act [section] 2 if it excludes rivals from the monopolized 
market by restricting a complementary or collaborative relationship without an 
adequate business justification.”).  He also contends that two notable Supreme Court 
cases implicitly applied his proposed rule.  See id. at 502-03 (asserting that the Courts 
in Eastman Kodak and Aspen Skiing presumed harm to competition from the absence 
of a legitimate business justification).  Though Baker’s proposal does not discuss 
intent, whether or not a defendant has a legitimate business justification necessarily 
turns on the purpose of the challenged practice.  Hence, it is fair to say that Baker’s 
presumption proposal effectively assigns an important role for intent evidence in 
monopolization analysis, at least in situations where his rule applies.  Timothy Muris, 
an antitrust academic and former Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, however, 
disagrees with Baker’s interpretation of case precedent and with his proposed rule.  
See Muris, supra note 19, at 703. 
 267. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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predatory pricing claim, for example, it helps to understand the 
purpose behind the dominant firm’s responses to a rival’s entry and, 
perhaps, the rival’s motivations for its responses. 
In fact, the many nuances that post-Chicago strategic analysis raises 
would be well served by considering intent.  Post-Chicago models 
merely show that, under various specified conditions, certain 
practices might be anticompetitive, but they cannot disprove possible 
efficient explanations.  Intent evidence would complement post-
Chicago theories and make their application more practical. 
Intent evidence is also key to the affirmative defense of 
procompetitive justification, which is available to defendants in all 
non per se antitrust cases.268  Essentially, defendants are allowed to 
offer legitimate business reasons for what would otherwise be 
considered anticompetitive conduct.  Demonstrating the reason for 
one’s behavior is, of course, equivalent to explaining one’s 
underlying purpose and intent. 
Interestingly, those generally opposed to the use of intent evidence 
to establish monopolization are not averse to probing intent to benefit 
the defendant.269  In fact, they argue that an innovation justification 
should be evaluated ex ante, rather than ex post, and that the 
defendant’s “pre-innovation intentions” must be examined.270  
Assume that a dominant firm’s redesigned product is inferior to the 
original and also resulted in the exclusion of its rivals.  In that event, 
a prima facie case of monopolization may be made out (through 
tying/bundling, for example).  However, if the dominant firm shows 
that it intended to create an improved product but that the effort 
                                                          
 268. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 
(1992) (reviewing Kodak’s proffered business justifications); Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985) (discussing defendant’s 
inability to persuade the jury that its conduct was competitively justified).  It is not 
entirely clear whether the Court in these two cases treated business justification as an 
affirmative defense or whether the lack of justification went toward establishing a 
prima facie case.  See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“[I]f a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under [section] 2 by 
demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may proffer a 
‘procompetitive justification’ for its conduct.”). 
 269. Compare e.g., Hovenkamp, Monopolization Offense, supra note 6, at 1039 (stating 
that “the ‘intent’ to create a monopoly anticompetitively cannot be distinguished 
from the intent to do so competitively”), with id. at 1046 (noting, “The real question 
is what the innovator had in mind.  If [the innovator’s] intent was to develop a 
superior gun, but this required a unique needle, then [the innovator] should not be 
penalized [under Sherman Act section 2] because its new gun/needle combination 
ended up working no better (or only a little better) than the old combination did”). 
 270. See id. (stating that, if “the redesigned product is not an improvement, then it 
becomes proper to probe the defendant’s pre-innovation intentions:  did it really set 
out to build a better product, or did it redesign only in order to exclude a rival?”). 
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simply failed, it is argued that the dominant firm’s conduct should 
not be considered exclusionary.271 
I do not disagree with this view.  To the extent that innovation is a 
lawful justification in monopolization analysis, it seems fair to focus 
on whether the monopolist intended an innovative or efficient result 
with its alleged exclusionary conduct, rather than on whether the 
effort succeeded.  But I find it inconsistent for critics to dismiss the 
value of intent evidence when it might tip the scale in favor of finding 
exclusionary conduct while touting its importance in exonerating the 
defendant. 
Today, commentators often deem intent inquiries insufficiently 
rigorous for antitrust—a legal discipline that is now intertwined with 
economics.272  But we have seen that pure economic analysis is, by no 
means, “scientific.”273  Given the inadequacy of economic theory and 
data, it is unrealistic to base an effects analysis solely on such 
evidence.  Intent evidence can be a helpful additional tool, provided 
that it is both reliable and manageable. 
IV. OVERCOMING THE OBJECTIONS:  INTENT EVIDENCE CAN BE 
RELIABLE AND MANAGEABLE 
Scholarly opinion overwhelmingly disfavors the use of intent 
evidence for a variety of reasons.274  It is said that the intent to act 
predatorily overlaps with the intent to act competitively;275 that intent 
inquiries are subjective and indeterminate;276 that juries may 
                                                          
 271. See id. (arguing that courts should not automatically equate a failed 
innovation with an anticompetitive one, due to the risks inherent in any innovation); 
see also id. (maintaining also that any innovation resulting in “significant actual 
improvement” cannot be challenged, regardless of intent). 
 272. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 220-40 (documenting the rise to prominence of 
the Chicago school of economic analysis and its influence on antitrust 
jurisprudence); see also POSNER, supra note 18, at 9-32 (contending that economic 
theory provides the only logical basis for antitrust law). 
 273. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 244, at 1065 (positing that “antitrust enforcement 
along economic lines . . . incorporates large doses of hunch, faith, and intuition”).    
 274. See, e.g., Brodley & Ma, supra note 147, at 1201 (observing that “intent 
evidence is generally inferior to objective evidence because competitive and 
anticompetitive motivations are often indistinguishable”); Hovenkamp, 
Monopolization Offense, supra note 6, at 1039 (asserting that “the ‘intent’ to create a 
monopoly anticompetitively cannot be distinguished from the intent to do so 
competitively”); POSNER, supra note 18, at 214-15 (stating the reasons for his distrust 
of intent evidence). 
 275. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 41, at 345 (observing that “competitive and 
exclusionary conduct look alike”); Hovenkamp, Monopolization Offense, supra note 6, 
at 1039 (“Indeed, in most circumstances involving monopoly, the ‘intent’ to create a 
monopoly anticompetitively cannot be distinguished from the intent to do so 
competitively.”). 
 276. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 214 (“Any doctrine that relies upon proof of 
intent is going to be applied erratically at best.”). 
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misconstrue employees’ “macho” language for corporate 
anticompetitive intent;277 and that the presence or absence of intent 
evidence is often merely “a function of luck and of the defendant’s 
legal sophistication.”278  Below, I demonstrate that these perceived 
problems are mostly overstated. 
A. Distinguishing Intent to Exclude Rivals Anticompetitively From Intent to 
Become Dominant Competitively 
One main objection to intent inquiries is the alleged difficulty of 
distinguishing between the intent to compete aggressively and the 
intent to exclude competition anticompetitively.279  Judge Frank 
Easterbrook encapsulated this line of opposition when he said that 
“[f]irms want (intend) to grow; they love to crush their rivals; indeed, 
these desires are the wellsprings of rivalry and the source of 
enormous benefit for consumers . . . the same elements of greed 
appear whether the entrepreneur wants to please customers or stifle 
rivals.”280  The gist of this argument is that every firm wishes to prevail 
over its competition, and that it is difficult to tell if it seeks to do by 
fulfilling customers’ needs or by eliminating its competitors through 
exclusionary strategies. 
Success in either scenario—striving to dominate the market by self 
improvement (procompetitive) or by stifling one’s rivals 
(anticompetitive)—would likely produce the same result:  the 
elimination of competitors, or their relegation to the market fringes.  
That means the intent to exclude rivals anticompetitively cannot and 
should not be inferred from the result of exclusion.  It does not mean, 
however, that the two intents are indistinguishable.  We simply have 
to focus, not on the fact of exclusion itself, but on why the dominant 
firm chose a particular ambiguous strategy, so that we can understand 
its probable effects. 
Take, for example, a dominant firm’s bundling of two products, x 
and y (when it dominates the market in x but not in y).  If corporate 
                                                          
 277. See id. at 214-15 (“Especially misleading is the inveterate tendency of sales 
executives to brag to their superiors about their competitive prowess, often using 
metaphors of coercion that are compelling evidence of predatory intent to the 
naïve.”). 
 278. See id. at 214 (contending that executives familiar with antitrust issues will not 
document any improper intent, while less knowledgeable executives might create 
evidence of such intent by using “a clumsy choice of words to describe innocent 
behavior”). 
 279. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (noting that many antitrust 
scholars do not believe that the two intents can be distinguished). 
 280. Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization:  Past, Present, and Future, 61 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 99, 102-03 (1992). 
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executives said, in planning the move, “We have to integrate y with x 
because y cannot stand on its own against the competition,” we would 
know that the firm bundled the two products in order to prevent 
competition on the merits in the y market.  Thus, its intent is 
anticompetitive.  If, on the other hand, corporate executives 
discussed how integration might enhance the demand for x by 
adding value to the product, for example, the intent would be 
procompetitive since the firm undertook its ambiguous strategy 
(bundling) in order to provide a better product. 
As another example, assume that a dominant firm entered into 
exclusive dealings with the major suppliers of an important input, 
which substantially increased its small rival’s costs.281  In that event, it 
would be helpful to know why the dominant firm entered those 
exclusive arrangements, so that we can draw inferences regarding 
their effects.  Suppose discovery reveals a document setting forth a 
plan to use exclusive arrangements to raise rivals’ costs and an 
accompanying projection of how much the firm can raise prices after 
the rival is sidelined.  In that case, we can reasonably infer that the 
dominant firm intended to exclude its rival anticompetitively.  If, 
however, documents show that the dominant firm adopted its 
exclusive dealing strategy in hopes of improving its own distribution 
efficiency, the firm’s intent would be proper even if its competitors 
are left in the dust as a result.  In the latter scenario, the exclusion of 
its rivals is merely a by-product of competition on the merits. 
Of course, not all situations will be crystal clear, and some intent 
evidence may be hard to interpret.  Even then, it is well within the 
institutional competence of courts and juries to make the fine factual 
distinctions that are required.282  Factfinders in our judicial system are 
routinely called upon to determine questions of who did what, and 
why, sometimes in murky situations.  In fact, liability or legality under 
numerous areas of American law (such as contract, tort, and 
criminal) often turns on intent, and juries are trusted in all these 
cases to ponder the evidence and to distinguish between good and 
bad intent.283  There is no reason to believe that juries are capable of 
making these distinctions in all types of cases except antitrust.  Thus, 
                                                          
 281. See supra Part I.B.2.b (discussing raising rivals’ costs and exclusionary 
conduct). 
 282. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467 
(1992) (“This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis, 
focusing on the ‘particular facts disclosed by the record.’”). 
 283. See generally Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952) (“Where 
intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question 
of fact which must be submitted to the jury.”). 
LAO.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:08:37 PM 
202 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:151 
the argument that intent evidence has little or no value because “the 
‘intent’ to create a monopoly anticompetitively cannot be 
distinguished from the intent to do so competitively” is vastly 
overstated. 
B. Objective Intent 
Another common objection to intent evidence focuses on its 
subjectivity and supposed unreliability.284  Some evidence of intent, 
inferred from concrete acts taken by the defendant, for example, is in 
fact quite objective.  As to this type of intent evidence, the 
unreliability critique is inapplicable. 
Consider, for example, two modern monopolization cases where 
intent (though not explicitly stressed) was a key factor:  Aspen Skiing285 
and Eastman Kodak.286  In both cases, liability under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act effectively turned on whether the defendant was able to 
show legitimate business justifications for its conduct.287  Whether a 
dominant firm’s conduct is justified requires knowing its purpose and 
intent; and, in both cases, evidence of that purpose and intent was 
objective in nature. 
Aspen Skiing involved claims that Aspen Skiing Co. (Ski Co.), after 
becoming dominant in the Aspen downhill ski market through 
acquisition of a competitor,288 terminated a popular multi-day all-
Aspen ticket that it had, for years, jointly offered with another 
competitor, Highlands.289  The joint ticket allowed skiers to ski on all 
four Aspen mountains, three of which were owned by Ski Co. and the 
fourth by Highlands.290  In upholding a jury verdict for the plaintiff, 
the Supreme Court stressed that the defendant had no “normal 
                                                          
 284. See infra Part IV.C (addressing the critique that intent evidence is unreliable 
because juries are likely to misinterpret ambiguous language of corporate 
executives). 
 285. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
 286. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 451. 
 287. See id. at 482-86 (affirming denial of summary judgment for defendant in a 
section 2 claim where there was a triable issue of fact concerning defendant’s reasons 
for its actions); Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605 (condemning the exclusion of 
competitors “on [any] basis other than efficiency” (quoting BORK, supra note 20, at 
138)). 
 288. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 588-90 (noting that defendant owned and operated 
three of the four major skiing facilities in Aspen). 
 289. See id. at 592 (observing that Ski Co. offered to continue to participate in the 
all-Aspen ticket, but only if Highlands accepted a fixed percentage of the revenue 
considerably lower than the average percentage Highlands had generated in the 
immediately preceding years). 
 290. See id. at 608 (stating that “Ski Co. did not persuade the jury that its conduct 
was justified by any normal business purpose . . . [t]hat conclusion is strongly 
supported by Ski Co.’s failure to offer any efficiency justification whatever.”). 
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business purpose” or “efficiency justification” for terminating the 
attractive all-Aspen ticket.291  In other words, Ski Co.’s refusal to deal 
could violate section 2 of the Sherman Act if it excluded Highlands 
on a non-efficiency basis, and without a legitimate business 
justification. 
The Court then considered the defendant’s proffered business 
justifications but found them to be pretextual.292  Ski Co. claimed to 
have terminated the joint ticket because the system for monitoring 
usage and allocating revenues was unreliable,293 and because 
Highlands’ alleged inferior facilities might mar defendant’s 
reputation.294  The evidence, however, showed that the all-Aspen 
ticket had been offered for years and was very popular with skiers.295  
Ski Co. had no prior complaints about either the quality of 
Highlands’ services or the system for determining usage and 
allocating revenues.296 
The evidence also showed that Ski Co. participated, and continued 
to participate, in offering the same type of joint multi-area tickets in 
other ski resorts where it operated but was not dominant.297  All this 
tended to show that the alleged flaws with the revenue division system 
and the supposed poor quality of plaintiff’s services were not the true 
reasons for Ski Co.’s actions.298  Given the objective nature of this 
intent evidence, it is hard to argue that it is, in any way, less reliable 
than any other type of evidence. 
Another example of objective intent evidence can be found in 
Eastman Kodak,299 which was earlier discussed in another context.300  
On a monopolization claim brought against Kodak by its competitors 
                                                          
 291. See id. at 601-05 (reasoning that the “right to refuse to deal” applies only to 
the extent that its exercise does not create or maintain a monopoly and asserting 
that any exclusion not based on efficiency constitutes such an improper exercise). 
 292. Id. at 608. 
 293. Id. at 590, 608-09 (describing the methods used to monitor usage). 
 294. Id. at 609-10. 
 295. See id. at 589-90, 592 (noting that all-Aspen tickets outsold passes featuring 
only Ski Co. facilities after 1967 and became twice as popular by the 1977-1978 
season). 
 296. Id. at 609-10. 
 297. Id. at 610. 
 298. See id. at 610-11 (stating that Ski Co.’s refusal to sell daily tickets to Highlands 
or to accept Highlands-issued coupons in exchange for Ski Co. tickets, where 
“accepting the coupons would have entailed no cost to Ski Co. itself, would have 
provided it with immediate benefits, and would have satisfied potential customers,” 
demonstrated a motivation to forego “short-run benefits and consumer goodwill 
[for] a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival”). 
 299. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
 300. See supra notes 161-83 and accompanying text (discussing Eastman Kodak in 
the context of arguing that post-Chicago effects analysis can be quite indeterminate). 
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in the copier service market (ISOs),301 the Supreme Court said that 
liability depends on “whether ‘valid business reasons’ can explain 
Kodak’s actions.”302  Kodak claimed to have expelled ISOs from the 
service market to protect its own good will, by assuring a high level of 
repair service for owners of its equipment.303  The ISOs, however, 
presented evidence to show that they had provided low-priced, 
quality service for years and were preferred by some Kodak 
equipment owners,304 thus suggesting that concern for its good will 
might not have been the true reason for Kodak’s exclusionary 
behavior.305 
Another reason Kodak offered for cutting off the ISOs’ supply of 
parts was that it needed to control inventory costs.306  The Court 
referred to evidence showing that Kodak not only refused to sell parts 
to the ISOs but also blocked the ISOs’ other avenues of access to 
Kodak parts, even though those alternate supply sources had no 
effect whatsoever on Kodak’s inventory costs.307  This suggested that 
the inventory cost control justification for Kodak’s refusal to deal 
might also have been pretextual.308 
Intent evidence played an important role in Microsoft as well, and 
part of that evidence was objective, as will be discussed below.  The 
government argued that Microsoft’s exclusion of Netscape’s browser 
and Sun’s Java likely prevented the growth of middleware that would 
have undermined Microsoft’s Windows monopoly.309  One alleged 
exclusionary practice was Microsoft’s prohibiting computer 
manufacturers (OEMs) from altering the computer desktop 
appearance and initial boot sequence, which was necessary for the 
pre-installation of Navigator.310  The license restrictions effectively 
                                                          
 301. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 459 (alleging that Kodak sought to monopolize 
the sale of service of Kodak copiers through selling replacement parts only to those 
using Kodak repair services or repairing the copiers themselves).  The plaintiffs also 
brought a Sherman Act section 1 claim alleging illegal tying arrangements.  Id. 
 302. Id. at 483 (quoting Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605). 
 303. See id. at 483-84 (noting Kodak’s claim that it wanted to avoid blame for 
equipment malfunctions due to alleged substandard ISO repair service). 
 304. Id. at 483. 
 305. See id. at 484 (doubting the veracity of Kodak’s proffered justification where 
Kodak permitted self-service repairs, and customers who repaired their own 
equipment should be as likely as customers using ISO services to blame Kodak 
equipment for breakdowns caused by “(their own) inferior service”). 
 306. Id. 
 307. See id. at 484-85. 
 308. See id. at 485-86 (holding Kodak’s “inventory costs” justification insufficient to 
entitle Kodak to summary judgment as a matter of law). 
 309. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 310. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 60-61 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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meant that no Windows-based computer would carry the Navigator 
browser.311 
Microsoft sought to partially justify the OEM license restrictions on 
its need to protect Windows’ “stability” and “consistency.”312  The 
evidence showed, however, that changes to the desktop appearance 
and boot sequence did not alter computer code and did not disrupt 
Windows, leading the court to conclude that the proffered reasons 
were not credible.313  The district court also noted that Microsoft had 
earlier attempted (unsuccessfully) to dissuade Netscape from 
continuing its efforts to develop Navigator’s middleware platform 
capabilities.314  All of this suggests that Microsoft imposed its license 
restrictions on the OEMs to undermine the success of Netscape’s 
browser, in order to protect its Windows monopoly,315 and not to 
protect the quality of Windows. 
The district court noted, too, that Microsoft spent over $100 
million in developing its IE browser, paid vast sums of money, and 
sacrificed millions more in profits to crush Navigator,316 although “it 
never intended to derive appreciable revenue” from its browser.317  
Microsoft even postponed the release of Windows 98 until 
development of IE was ready, even though the delay cost Microsoft 
the lucrative back-to-school and holiday selling seasons.318  From this 
cumulative evidence, the court concluded that Microsoft’s purpose 
was to neutralize “a threat to the applications barrier to entry.”319  
Where the intent evidence is objective, the unreliability critique has 
no real application. 
                                                          
 311. Id. at 60-62 (affirming the finding that pre-installation of multiple browsers 
increases an OEM’s support costs and reasoning that by prohibiting OEMs from 
deleting visible means of access to Internet Explorer, Microsoft’s own pre-installed 
browser, Microsoft effectively precluded OEMs from installing rival browsers such as 
Navigator). 
 312. Id. at 63-64. 
 313. See id.  
 314. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(observing that, after Netscape rejected the offer, Microsoft sought to maximize 
Internet Explorer’s usage share of the market by pressuring OEMs to distribute and 
promote only Internet Explorer); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 
¶¶ 79-92 (D.D.C. 1999) (detailing the Microsoft-Netscape negotiations); see also id. at 
¶¶ 93-132 (surveying the experiences of other computer industry firms in dealing 
with Microsoft over the development of certain software products). 
 315. See Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39-40 (finding Microsoft’s asserted justification 
for bundling Internet Explorer with Windows 95 inconsistent with the evidence and 
thus viewing its actions as “part of a larger campaign to quash innovation that 
threatened its monopoly position”). 
 316. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶ 139. 
 317. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 42. 
 318. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 167-68. 
 319. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 42. 
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C. Subjective Intent and Risk of Adjudicatory Error 
More controversial are the purely subjective statements made by 
dominant firm employees.  One objection to the use of such 
statements relates to the perceived difficulty of assigning corporate 
intent.320  Critics fear that random comments of (or documents 
authored by) employees who do not truly speak for the corporation 
might be mistakenly attributed to the corporation as expressions of 
its intent.321  Another persistent objection is that business people are 
prone to use sports and war metaphors when speaking of the 
competition, such as vowing to “cut off [the rival’s] air supply,”322 
which might mislead juries to infer anticompetitive intent even if 
none exists.323 
The difficulties involved in attributing intent to a corporation are 
greatly overstated.  It should be entirely safe to attribute to the 
corporation, as an expression of its intent, statements made by its 
chief executive officer or its senior executives because these 
executives constitute the firm’s top management and act on its 
behalf.324  When Bill Gates speaks of his perception of the threat 
posed by Netscape,325 or of how that threat must be handled,326 it 
would be strange indeed to suggest that his subjective statements 
cannot be assigned to Microsoft. 
Similarly, when senior Microsoft executives responsible for 
corporate strategy express deep concern with Navigator’s moving “in 
a direction that could diminish the applications barrier to entry,”327 
                                                          
 320. See, e.g., David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property, 24 J. CORP. L. 485, 514-16 (1999) (stressing the difficulty of determining the 
intention of a firm). 
 321. See id. at 514 (“More generally, what one identifies as “the firm’s” intention in 
the run of cases will probably depend on who is asked, and even then the answer of 
one individual may not be worth much.”). 
 322. Complaint at ¶ 16, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 
1999) (No.98-1232). 
 323. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 18, at 214-15 (“Especially misleading is the 
inveterate tendency of sales executives to brag to their superiors about their 
competitive prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that are compelling 
evidence of predatory intent to the naïve.”). 
 324. See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 
GEO. L.J. 1215, 1219 (2003) (arguing that top management can uniquely influence 
the behavior and actions of the corporation). 
 325. See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶ 72 (warning his executives that Netscape was 
“pursuing a multi-platform strategy” that would “commoditize the underlying 
operating system”). 
 326. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Mr. Gates who said that “[w]inning Internet browser share is a very 
important goal” for Microsoft, and who warned of the need to stop OEMs from pre-
installing Navigator and internet providers from using Navigator). 
 327. Id. 
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we can assume that they are expressing the collective belief and 
concern of the corporation, given the speakers’ status and the 
settings in which the remarks are made.  Similarly, when senior 
Microsoft executives exchange a series of emails to the effect that 
Microsoft’s browser cannot compete on the merits against Netscape’s 
browser and that its browser must therefore be integrated with 
Windows,328 it is reasonable to attribute these subjective statements to 
the corporation. 
As for statements made, or documents prepared, by middle 
management, a good rule of thumb would be to attribute to the 
corporation those statements and documents relating to matters 
within the middle manager’s areas of responsibility, provided that the 
manager has policy-making authority.329  Within those defined areas, 
middle management with policy-making functions should be deemed 
to act on behalf of the corporation and their statements considered 
that of the corporation.330 
In addition to stressing the difficulty of assigning “intention” to 
firms, some commentators also oppose subjective intent evidence on 
the ground that juries could easily misconstrue the “macho” language 
often used by business people.331  Stated differently, critics contend 
that subjective intent evidence is suspect because executives may say, 
“We want to cut off our opponent’s air supply” without actually 
meaning it, but juries may take those statements at face value.  This 
argument also has very little merit. 
Assessing whether a particular statement has significance or should 
be ignored as “a clumsy choice of words to describe innocent 
behavior”332 is precisely the function of juries in our judicial system.333  
We routinely trust jurors to make these kinds of judgments in other 
situations,334 and there is no reason to believe that they are, for some 
                                                          
 328. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶¶ 166-69 (stating that “[p]itting browser against 
browser is hard,” and that Microsoft’s IE browser must be bound more tightly to 
Windows because “it will be very hard [for Microsoft] to increase browser market 
share on the merits”). 
 329. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn:  No Body to Kick”:  An Unscandalized 
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 398 (1981) 
(noting that mid-level managers often bear the responsibility of implementing 
corporate goals). 
 330. Cf. id. 407-11 (justifying liability for mid-level managers on the basis of their 
influence and control over the corporation’s behavior). 
 331. POSNER, supra note 18, at 214-15 (cautioning that juries could wrongly infer 
anticompetitive intent from the tendency of executives to brag about their 
competitive prowess). 
 332. Id. at 214. 
 333. See generally ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 23-66 (2001) 
(explaining the role, function, and purpose of a civil jury). 
 334. Business executives are certainly not the only people who may use language 
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reason, more obtuse or more susceptible of being led astray in 
antitrust litigation than in other cases.  Juries are a microcosm of our 
society and should certainly understand that business people 
sometimes use sports and war metaphors when they speak of their 
competition—just as they surely understand that people sometimes 
say, “I’ll kill you,” or “you will pay,” after very bitter arguments, 
without actually meaning their words. 
We also have an adversarial system where counsel for dominant 
firms are free to cross examine witnesses, introduce evidence, and 
otherwise argue that certain statements are just macho talk and 
nothing more.  But it should be up to the jury to ultimately decide 
whether a particular statement expresses intent or was just loose talk.  
The notion that subjective intent evidence should be ignored because 
the jury might “get it wrong” is very odd, given the role of juries in 
the judicial system. 
Provided that they are credible, subjective statements can be very 
useful guides to the interpretation of the objective steps that 
dominant firms took, even when the objective steps themselves are 
ambiguous.  For example, Bill Gates’ concern over computer 
manufacturers’ (OEMs) altering the computer “boot sequence” 
(which made consumer choice of Netscape’s Navigator browser 
easier);335 his stress on the importance of preventing the OEMs from 
promoting Navigator and the internet providers that use Navigator;336 
and his warning that Netscape was “pursuing a multi-platform 
strategy” that would “commoditize” Windows337 are all helpful in 
explaining the severe OEM license restrictions that Microsoft 
subsequently imposed.  On their own, the license restrictions may be 
somewhat ambiguous:  there are myriad reasons why any copyright 
owner might wish to control the terms of its license agreement.338  But 
Bill Gates’ state-of-mind expressions clarified the reasons for, and 
implications of, Microsoft’s actions. 
Similarly, various internal communications among Microsoft 
executives regarding the IE browser and Windows 98 are helpful to 
the interpretation of Microsoft’s subsequent actions relating to 
                                                          
loosely.  And juries are usually trusted to determine whether a particular statement is 
to be taken as some evidence of liability (or guilt), or whether it is inconsequential 
“loose talk,” based on the context and other evidence. 
 335. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 61-62 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 336. See id. at 62 (noting that the prevention of OEMs from promoting rival 
browsers protects Microsoft’s market share). 
 337. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, ¶ 72 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 338. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 62-64 (noting Microsoft’s attempt to justify its license 
restrictions as the exercise of valid copyrights and as necessary to prevent substantial 
alteration of copyrighted work). 
LAO.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:08:37 PM 
2004] INTENT IN MONOPOLIZATION ANALYSIS 209 
Netscape.  Statements such as “I don’t understand how IE is going to 
win [without integration],”339 or “[p]itting browser against browser is 
hard,”340 or “it will be very hard to increase browser share on the 
merits of IE 4 alone,”341 are informative because, among other things, 
they help us discriminate between two competing stories for the 
bundling:  the anticompetitive one (to crush competition) and the 
procompetitive one (to enhance the value of Windows). 
With respect to the Java threat, internal email communications and 
other documents stating that Microsoft’s strategic goal is to “[k]ill 
cross-platform Java by grow[ing] the polluted Java market;”342 that the 
company “should just quietly grow [its Java version] and assume that 
people will take more advantage of [it] without ever realizing that 
they are building win32-only java apps,”343 and that it hopes to cause 
“Intel to stop helping Sun” are valuable evidence toward explaining 
Microsoft’s various actions on the Java front.344 
Consider also LePage’s,345 a recent case involving claims that 3M, 
which manufactures an extensive line of office products (including 
scotch tape), unlawfully maintained its transparent tape monopoly by 
offering its customers large bundled rebates that were conditioned 
on the customers’ reaching specific purchase targets across several 
product lines.346  The bundled rebate program allegedly caused most 
of LePage’s former customers to switch to 3M for their transparent 
tape purchase.347  Since there was no evidence that, with the rebate, 
3M’s transparent tape was sold below cost,348 it is more difficult to 
determine whether the bundled rebates constitute legitimate 
competition or unlawful exclusionary conduct.  While the Third 
Circuit did not explicitly rely on intent in finding the conduct 
exclusionary and anticompetitive, it referred to evidence of 3M’s 
intent to use the rebate program to expel LePage’s from the market, 
then cease or curtail its own private-label (low-price) tape 
production, and subsequently raise its prices on its “scotch” 
(premium) tape.349 
                                                          
 339. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at ¶ 166. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at ¶ 169. 
 342. Id. (citations omitted). 
 343. Id. at ¶ 394. 
 344. Id. at ¶ 406. 
 345. LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 346. See id. at 145, 154. 
 347. Id. at 157 (explaining the monetary effect of 3M’s bundling on LePage’s sales 
of transparent tape). 
 348. Id. at 147 n.5 (“LePage’s has not contested 3M’s assertion” that its pricing was 
above cost). 
 349. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing 3M’s intent to force 
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To the extent that credible statements were made by 3M executives 
to that effect, they can be very helpful in analyzing and interpreting 
the complex rebate incentive program.  On its own, the bundled 
rebates could conceivably be viewed as merely a legitimate volume 
discount package.  But statements from 3M executives indicating a 
different purpose for the rebate and the desire to ultimately “kill” 
private-label tape350 and then raise scotch tape prices351 help clarify the 
effect of the rebate.  These statements, combined with other 
evidence, make it easier to interpret the action that 3M took. 
To minimize the possibility that an isolated loose remark might be 
misused against the company, we could require that subjective 
statements carry some indicia of credibility.  First, if the statement is 
largely uncontradicted, its reliability factor would be enhanced.  For 
example, if a senior Microsoft executive had said, “we want to 
integrate our browser with Windows because our browser is not 
competitive otherwise,” and there is very little or no contradictory 
evidence (such as documents showing a desire to enhance consumer 
demand for Windows by adding value to it), then the subjective 
statement is unlikely to be an idle, inconsequential remark. 
Second, if a subjective statement is made contemporaneously with 
the alleged exclusionary act, it is also likely to be credible.  Thus, if 
the above browser integration statement is made within the same 
time frame as Microsoft’s various actions thwarting the distribution of 
Netscape’s browser, the statement is probably not a stray, meaningless 
comment.  Similarly, in LePage’s, if subjective statements concerning 
“killing” private label tape and boasting of 3M’s subsequent leverage 
over large retailers are made around the time of the implementation 
of the complex bundled rebates, the statements are likely to be 
credible. 
Third, if a subjective statement is made in settings where it has cost 
consequences, the statement would also bear the mark of credibility.  
For example, an internal email (sent by a company executive) 
advising employees of a business strategy and exhorting them to act 
accordingly is a highly credible piece of intent evidence.  The email 
in question is unlikely to be a mere off-the-cuff expression because 
employees are expected to act upon it, and it would be costly to the 
firm if employees were to follow “instructions” that were not intended 
                                                          
LePage’s from the market). 
 350. Id. at 164. 
 351. See id. at 163 (noting that, “3M’s interest in raising prices is well-documented 
in the record . . . . In internal memoranda . . . 3M executives boasted that the large 
retailers like Office Max and Staples had no choice but to adhere to 3M’s demands” 
and that “the price of Scotch-brand tape increased.”). 
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to be taken seriously.  Therefore, the email should be considered 
credible evidence of intent. 
If these indicia of credibility are present, subjective statements 
made by a firm’s senior executives could reliably aid in the 
interpretation of facts.  To the extent that an antitrust defendant 
considers a specific subjective statement or document too prejudicial, 
it can always file a motion in limine to seek its exclusion, just as in any 
other litigation.352  A wholesale exclusion of subjective intent 
evidence, or an undue elevation of the standard of sufficiency for 
such evidence, is an unnecessarily broad “remedy” against the 
possibility that juries might err. 
A final criticism of intent evidence that has been made is that the 
presence or absence of intent evidence in litigation “is often a 
function of luck and the defendant’s legal sophistication.”353  
Sophisticated firms “will not leave a documentary trail of improper 
intent,”354 whereas firms unschooled in antitrust law will be trapped by 
their “clumsy choice of words to describe innocent behavior.”355  The 
observation that the legal system favors the legally sophisticated is no 
doubt correct.  Still, the argument that intent evidence is meaningless 
because the legally well-informed may know how to evade liability 
while the unwary may be caught is unpersuasive. 
Whenever liability turns even partially on intent, there is probably 
always a bias in favor of sophisticated corporate defendants and 
against unsophisticated ones.  Sophisticated firms are less likely to 
generate “hot” documents evidencing improper intent.  
Unsophisticated firms, on the other hand, might conceivably have 
bad intent attributed to them because of corporate executives’ 
documented loose remarks that may not evidence the firm’s true 
intentions.356  But this is an argument that resonates, not just in 
antitrust, but in any case where intent is relevant. 
For example, the termination of a minority employee because of a 
superior’s racial bias would violate employment discrimination laws, 
whereas his termination for unsatisfactory performance would not be 
illegal.357  A legally sophisticated firm that seeks to dismiss an 
                                                          
 352. See FED R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .”). 
 353. POSNER, supra note 18, at 214. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. at 216. 
 356. See id. (observing that unsophisticated firms often create rich evidence of 
improper intent by a “clumsy choice of words to describe innocent behavior”). 
 357. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003). 
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employee for racially motivated reasons could well paper its records 
prior to dismissal to show various supposed deficiencies in the 
employee’s performance.  It would also do its best to leave no hint in 
the corporate record of the superior’s racial animus toward the 
employee.  Perhaps evidence of the latter would surface in 
depositions, or perhaps not. 
On the other hand, continuing with an employment discrimination 
example, a legally unsophisticated firm that had dismissed a minority 
employee for reasons unrelated to his race could well face scrutiny if 
discovery reveals several racially prejudiced remarks made by the 
employee’s superiors at some point during his period of employment.  
And, adjudicatory errors are not implausible.  Yet, few would seriously 
argue that, because the system is imperfect, evidence of intent is 
inherently suspect.358 
CONCLUSION 
This article concludes that monopolization analysis will be well 
served by according more respect to intent evidence.  While 
acknowledging that this view runs counter to the Chicago and post-
Chicago schools’ commitment to an exclusive economic approach to 
antitrust, I argue that empirical data and economic theory alone are 
sometimes inadequate for evaluating whether an alleged exclusionary 
practice has anticompetitive effects.  This is particularly true in 
markets where innovation competition is important and where 
network effects are substantial. 
When an effects analysis using only economic tools yields 
inconclusive results, I argue that we should turn to intent evidence 
for further guidance and possibly as a proxy for effect.  Indeed, 
Microsoft is an example of a modern monopolization case where the 
court made numerous references to the defendant’s bad intent, thus 
confirming that intent evidence still plays an important role in some 
monopolization cases, despite much rhetoric to the contrary.359 
                                                          
 358. Of course, in this employment discrimination hypothetical, intent is the 
ultimate issue to be decided, see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 
153 (2000), whereas in monopolization analysis, intent is merely probative of effect.  
Thus, the two situations are not legally analogous.  The point of this example, 
however, is to demonstrate that legally sophisticated firms generally know better than 
to leave a documentary trail of intent evidence in a variety of cases, not just in 
antitrust.  Yet the law does not say that intent evidence is, therefore, of little value. 
 359. See supra note 2 (citing several cases criticizing the use of intent evidence); see 
also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissing intent 
evidence as devoid of value in antitrust cases); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 
270 n.14 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting opinion and intent evidence); A.A. Poultry Farms 
v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (explaining that intent 
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Finally, while commentators have raised a number of objections to 
the use of intent evidence in monopolization analysis, this article 
concludes that the objections are mostly overstated.  Intent evidence, 
in fact, can be reliable and manageable.  In short, there is a place for 
intent evidence in monopolization analysis. 
 
                                                          
evidence does not help courts to distinguish between competitive and 
monopolization efforts). 
